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11. Introduction
During the summer of 2007 problems with U.S. subprime mortgages became public and 
subprime lenders in the U.S. went into bankruptcy. Financial institutions all over the 
world announced write downs of assets because they had invested in securities that were 
related to U.S. subprime mortgage loans. The fact that nobody knew who was affected 
created a situation of uncertainty and stock markets fell worldwide. Central banks had 
to pump billions of dollars in the markets to provide liquidity. The threatening danger of 
a recession in the U.S. and the bits and pieces of published losses without knowing the 
full extent forced stock markets to stay highly volatile in the second half of the year 
2007 and reacting sensitive to news.
In my thesis I want to analyze the U.S. subprime mortgage crises, how it became a 
worldwide financial crisis and what have to be changed in regulations in order to 
prevent such developments in the future. 
In the first section, I start with a characterization of the U.S. market for subprime
residential mortgage loans and how subprime mortgages are sold on the secondary 
market. Then I discuss the roots of the U.S. subprime mortgage crises followed by 
market developments. I take a particular look at the impact on Austria and the ATX. In 
a correlation analysis I examine if the correlation coefficients between the ATX and 
other major European and American stock indices changed significantly before August 
2007 and afterwards. In the last section I discuss future prospects and required changes 
of regulations of the U.S. subprime lending industry, the U.S. economy and the banking 
industry. I finish my thesis with a world economic outlook.
22. The U.S. Market for Subprime Residential 
Mortgages and Mortgage-related Securities
Lax et al (2004) defined subprime lending as a controversial segment of the United 
States (U.S.) mortgage market which is the largest debt market in the world.
2.1 Subprime Mortgages
According to Fabozzi (2002) a mortgage is a loan that is secured by the collateral of 
some specified real estate property. The borrower is obliged to make a predetermined 
series of payments. The mortgage gives the lender the right to foreclose on the loan and 
seize the property if the borrower fails to make these contracted payments in order to 
ensure that the debt is paid off. If an individual for example wants to fund a home 
purchase, he can apply for a loan from a mortgage originator. The mortgage originator 
performs a credit evaluation to decide whether the loan will be provided or not. The two 
most important factors to evaluate are the payment-to-income (PTI) ratio and the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio. The first one is the ratio of monthly payments to monthly income 
and represents a measure of the applicant’s ability to make the monthly payments. The 
second is the ratio of the amount of the loan to the market value of the property and 
indicates the protection the lender has in case the applicant defaults on monthly 
payments and the lender must repossess and sell the property.
There exist traditional standard underwriting guidelines of the three Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), namely are The Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), 
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). These guidelines
require full documentation of income, employment and deposits, and 28% mortgage 
payment to monthly income, 36% total debt to monthly income and 80% loan to value 
as a maximum. 
3Additionally the applicant’s credit history is measured by the FICO score. The FICO 
scoring system was developed by Fair Isaacs & Company and is used by lenders in the 
home equity, home mortgage, credit card and auto market. The FICO score is based on 
the applicant’s previous credit history, length of credit history, current level of 
indebtedness, number of new credit inquiries and the type of credit available. Standard 
underwriting guidelines require a FICO score that is greater than 660. If a mortgage 
loan meets this underwriting standards mentioned before it is called a conforming loan 
and consequently if it fails the underwriting standards it is referred to as a 
nonconforming loan.
Borrowers who do satisfy the underwriting standards are referred to as A credit 
borrowers or prime borrowers and those who fail as B and C borrowers or subprime 
borrowers.
Johnson, Levy and Temkin (2002) group the products offered in the subprime market in 
three different groups:
 Home purchase and refinance mortgages targeted to borrowers with poor credit 
histories. The larger shares of these loans (80%) are refinance mortgages. Most 
time borrowers refinance mortgages for an amount greater than the unpaid 
principal on the original mortgage, thereby taking “cash out” of the transaction.
 Alt A mortgages that are originated to borrowers who can’t document all of the 
relevant underwriting information when they apply for a loan. The purpose is 
again either to purchase a home or to refinance an existing mortgage. The FICO 
scores of these borrowers are comparable to those in the prime market.
 High loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages, which are originated to borrowers with 
relatively good credit scores but with LTV ratios that sometimes exceed 150%. 
4There is different information about on the contribution on each of these three types of 
loan to the total subprime market. Johnson, Levy and Temkin (2002) stated in their
article that credit-impaired lending is about 75% of all subprime loans originated.
2.2 Development of the U.S. Subprime Mortgage Market
Consequently subprime lenders originate subprime mortgage loans to borrowers who do 
not qualify for loans based on standard underwriting guidelines, because they are 
perceived to have high credit risk. In some cases a mortgage broker acts between the 
subprime mortgage lender and the borrower.
Johnson, Levy and Temkin (2002) state that subprime lending is a different type of 
business compared to prime lending. In their interviews subprime lenders explained that 
originating loans to borrowers with low credit scores requires a personalized and 
manual underwriting process. Only with that a subprime lender can set appropriate 
prices for borrowers who are more creditworthy than their low credit scores might 
suggest. So the challenge is to judge and price risks accurately according to other 
standards used in the prime market in order to serve costumers who would otherwise 
not get access to a loan. 
All mortgage borrowers are expected to earn sufficient income to make their payment 
obligations. Prime mortgage borrowers must document this ability with pay stubs, tax 
records and other financial documents. Canner, Laderman, and Passmore (1999) explain 
that the low doc or no doc segment of the subprime mortgage market serves borrowers 
who can not or do not want to provide this documentation.  
What do the typical subprime borrowers look like and where in the U.S. do we find a 
high concentration of originated subprime mortgages? Subprime borrowers often have a 
weak credit history or other characteristics which are associated with a high probability 
of default. Lax, Manti and Raca (2004) analyzed the economic efficiency and found out 
that subprime borrowers are disproportionately part of a minority and lower income 
5group, less well educated, less financially sophisticated and less likely to search for the 
best interest rate when applying for a mortgage. Therefore subprime borrowers are more 
often riskier compared to their prime counterparts and pay higher rates and fees for their 
mortgages. Courchane, Surette and Zorn (2004) confirmed these findings with their 
analysis. They stated that subprime borrowers are less likely to be informed about the 
mortgage process and are less likely to search for the best mortgage rates. These 
circumstances make them possibly more vulnerable to mortgage outcomes, which are 
unfavourable. Further they showed persistence to the subprime market segment because 
borrowers are more likely to take out a subprime loan if their previous mortgage came 
from the subprime market segment. Additionally the analyses of the survey responses 
they made could show that borrowers with subprime mortgages are significantly 
dissatisfied with their mortgage outcome. 
According to The Canner, Laderman and Passmore (1999) the proportion of minority 
and lower income borrowers is much higher in the subprime market than in the prime 
market. Scheessele (1998) documented that in the year 1998 African Americans and 
Hispanics accounted for less than 8% of conventional home purchase mortgages in the 
prime market whereas their fraction was nearly 20% in the subprime market. The same 
could be observed for refinance mortgages where 6% of all prime refinance mortgages 
but nearly 17% of all subprime refinancing mortgages were taken out by these 
minorities.
These racial disparities are not solely due to income. Immergluck and Wiles (1999)
showed in a multivariate analysis of subprime lending activity that the proportion of 
loans originated by subprime lenders in a given census tract was most affected by the 
tract’s racial composition, irrespective of income.
How did the U.S. market for subprime mortgage loans develop? After changes in
legislation in the early 1980s lenders could originate mortgages with prices and features 
that were previously forbidden. Mansfield (2000) explained that the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) adopted in 1980 
deregulated loan rates through the pre-emption of state interest rate caps for first lien 
6loans on a borrower’s house and through not setting an alternative rate cap and set a 
framework for higher interest rates.
The Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA), adopted in 1982, pre-
empted state laws that restricted a number of alternative mortgage features. The aim 
was an increase of loan products that reduced the up-front costs to borrowers in order to 
make homeownership more affordable. Lenders were allowed to originate mortgages 
with features such as variable interest rates, balloon payments and negative 
amortization.
In the following period the demand for home equity loans increased, but it is unclear 
whether lenders created a market for home equity loans or whether these laws made it 
easier to react on the increasing demand for such loans. Rising home values during the 
1980s increased the amount of homeowner equity in the U.S. Additionally the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 created another incentive because it contained a passage that 
prohibited taxpayers to deduct interest on consumer loans while it allowed them to 
deduct interest paid on mortgage loans secured by their principal residence and one 
additional home. 
Mansfield (2000) stated that an increased number of homeowners used their home 
equity to retire other forms of credit because home equity mortgages were an alternative 
to unsecured consumer debt. In the year 1988 35% of home equity loans were used to 
repay other debt compared to 45% of such loans used to pay for home improvements. In 
1994 these fractions changed respectively to 68% and 38%1. 
The growth in the 1990s was driven by the increased demand for home mortgage equity 
and technological developments like computerized loan application and automated 
underwriting systems, which made it easier for brokers and lenders to originate 
subprime mortgages. Brokers and mortgage companies started to originate a larger 
number of subprime mortgages in 1994 in order to maintain profits and utilize existing 
1 Because some loans were used for more than one purpose these numbers do not add to 100%.
7capacity after prime loan volumes declined because the Federal Reserve increased 
interest rates.
As the growth of subprime market lending continued consumer groups and government 
regulators were concerned that some lenders in the subprime market took advantage of 
borrowers by engaging in questionable marketing techniques and fraudulent business 
practices. Such borrowers were accused of practicing predatory lending. According to 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) predatory lending 
involves practices in which lenders, brokers or home improvement contractors have
been engaged in deception or fraud. The borrower is manipulated through aggressive 
sales tactics or lenders take unfair advantage of the borrower’s lack of understanding 
about loan terms. Additionally loan terms are used that are abusive or make the 
borrower more vulnerable to abusive practices. Bunce and Fishbein (2000) explained 
that the HUD identified four frequent predatory practices: loan flipping, charging 
borrowers excessive fees and packing them into the loan amount, lending without taking 
into account the borrower’s ability to repay and finally outright fraud and abuse.
A mortgage broker is a salesman who wants to maximize his net income. This means 
that a broker does not always act in the interest of the borrower providing him the 
cheapest mortgage. Moreover, the opposite is the case since lenders sometimes pay 
brokers premiums if they sell loans with interest rates above the minimum acceptable 
rate for the loan (yield-spread premiums) or loans with heavy prepayment penalties. 
Renuart (2004) argued that because a broker bears little or no risk in case of a default of 
a borrower, there are no economic incentives to originate loans that are affordable for 
borrowers in the long run.
Such abusive and predatory lending increased since brokers and mortgage companies 
were only weakly regulated. A large extent of subprime loans was made by companies 
that specialized in mortgage lending. According to Gramlich (2007), 50% of subprime 
loans were made by independent mortgage companies that were state-chartered but not 
much subject to federal supervision and 30% were made by subsidiaries of banks and 
thrifts that were less lightly supervised than their parent company. These independent 
8mortgage companies and bank subsidiaries were not deposit-taking institutions and 
therefore not subject to regulations that govern federal or state banks. Because they are 
state-chartered, they are subject to state law. The Home Owners’ Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA) and the Community Reinvestment Act monitor these entities less closely. In 
some states there have been tries to apply federal predatory lending advisories to all 
lenders or to regulate brokers and lenders, but states have fewer resources for oversight 
than the federal government. 
Regulatory agencies increased their oversight of the subprime lending market and as a 
result the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision started to 
set policies like capital standards that would affect more subprime lenders. Additionally 
guidelines that provided recommendations for the banks, from managing the risks of 
subprime lending to selling the mortgages, were published.
The expansion of subprime mortgage lending in the period 2001 to 2006 came primary 
through a well defined channel of financial intermediaries. The players in this channel 
were brokers, mortgage companies and firms, which securitized these mortgages and 
sold them on to the capital markets. All of the financial intermediaries mentioned before 
were interested in an increase in the supply of loans. One outcome was a significant 
increase in the rate of homeownership that rose from 64% to 69% in the years from 
1994 to 2005 as data from the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce
show2.
Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman, remarked on April 8, 2005 that 
advances in technology had changed mortgage lending: “Where once more-marginal 
applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now able to quite 
efficiently judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to price that risk 
appropriately.”3
2 Data from the Bureau of the Census U.S. Department of Commerce. Available at
http://www.danter.com/statistics/homeown.htm (visited January 14, 2008).
3 See Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve System’s Fourth Annual Community 
Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C., April 8, 2005. Available at
92.3. Mortgage-related Securities
In this section I examine how subprime mortgages are securitized and sold on the 
secondary market. I start with the characteristics of simple asset-backed aecurities 
(ABSs) and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) before I move on to structured products 
like collateralized debt obligation (CDO).
Asset-backed securities (ABSs) and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) are securities 
entitled to the cash flows from a specified pool of assets. Subprime mortgage loans are
often sold on the secondary market where they are pooled and become the underlying 
assets for MBSs. Consequently a MBS is a type of bond or note collateralized by the 
interest and principal payments of a set of mortgage loans. 
According to Hayre (2001) ABSs and MBSs constitute the largest sector of the U.S. 
bond market. While the term MBSs is used to refer to securities backed by residential 
home mortgage loans, ABSs are securities collateralized by other types of loans like 
consumer or car loans but also by home equity loans (HELs) or by manufactured 
housing loans (MHs). The total volume of outstanding MBSs has increased from about 
$100 billion in the year 1980 to $3000 billion in the year 2000. 
The cash flows produced by the assets can be distributed to investors either by a simple 
pass-through security which comprises the bulk of ABSs or MBSs or by allocating them 
according to specific rules and creating a structured securities such as collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) or collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs)4.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2005/20050408/default.htm (visited February 20, 
2008).
4 Since a collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO) is a particular type of a collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO) I will use the general term CDO in the rest of this thesis but focus on those backed by residential 
home mortgage loans.
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The three housing finance agencies Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enforced 
the development of the secondary mortgage market in the U.S. These agencies were 
created by the U.S. government in order to facilitate the flow of mortgage capital by 
buying mortgage loans for cash from lenders or issuing an MBS in exchange for pools 
of mortgage loans. MBS issued by one of the three agencies can be referred to as
agency MBS.
Banks, life insurance companies, pension funds and foreign investors are the main 
investors in agency MBSs. The reasons why these institutional investors invest in 
agency MBSs are higher returns compared to U.S. treasuries or corporate bonds and 
liquidity. Also because of the close ties of the three agencies to the U.S. government,
MBSs are perceived to have minimal credit risk.
Fabozzi (2002) defines nonagency MBS as mortgage-backed securities that are not 
issued by government sponsored entities. Instead nonagency MBSs are issued by 
private entities and their collateral consists of nonconforming loans like subprime 
mortgage loans. Nonagency MBSs can also be grouped in nonagency pass-through 
securities and nonagency CDOs that are described later. The most important difference 
is that nonagency MBSs have default risk since there is no explicit or implicit
governmental guarantee of cashflows.  
Banks and thrifts sell their mortgages primarily to government sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae whereas independent companies primarily 
sell to other financial market outlets5.
But since subprime MBSs often get a low credit score they can not become part of a 
portfolio of many professionally managed funds. This problem is solved by slicing the 
MBS/ABS into tranches and creating new structured finance instruments like 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
5 See Schumer C. and Maloney C.: The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth, 
Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How We Got Here, Report and Recommendations by the 
Majority Staff of the Joint Economic Committee, October 2007, available at 
http://jec.senate.gov/Documents/Reports/10.25.07OctoberSubprimeReport.pdf (visited December 10, 
2007).
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Fender and Mitchell (2005) defined structured finance instruments through three 
distinct characteristics: 
 Pooling of assets which either are cash-based or synthetically created.
 De-linking of the credit risk of the collateral asset pool from the credit risk of the 
originator. For this purpose the assets are transferred to a standalone special 
purpose vehicle (SPV).
 Tranching of liabilities which are backed by the asset pool. 
The first two steps are also used in classical pass-through securitisations but the 
tranching of liabilities is the key element in structured finance products.
A cash flow CDO is a structured finance product that securitizes a pool of debt assets 
into different classes of notes or bonds from the cash flows generated by such assets6. In 
general, the underlying assets can be corporate bonds, bank loans, emerging market
sovereign debt, credit derivatives, ABSs, MBSs or other structured finance securities. 
Fabozzi (2002) explained that it is uncommon that nonconforming mortgage loans are 
securitized as a pass-through security like a MBS to become the underlying asset of a 
MBS CDO. Instead in the subprime market mortgage loans that have not been 
securitized as pass-through become underlying assets of a CDO directly.
6 See The Barclays Capital Guide to Cash Flow Collateralized Debt Obligations, available at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/barclays_cdoguide.pdf (visited November 25, 2007).
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Figure 1: Subprime Mortgage Loans in a CDO Transaction
How subprime mortgage loans become the underlying assets of a CDO can be seen in
Figure 1. A mortgage lender originates subprime mortgage loans directly or via a 
mortgage broker to borrowers. Afterwards the originator sells a portfolio of loans and 
other debt obligations to a created special purpose vehicle (SPV) that is a legal entity.
The cash received is used by the mortgage lender to fund fresh mortgages for new 
borrowers. The debt obligation pool is classified into several tranches with different risk 
exposure: senior tranches (rated AAA), mezzanine tranches (AA to BB), subordinated 
tranches (below BB) and equity or junior tranches, which are unrated and the most 
risky. The SPV refinance the purchase by issuing tradable securities like notes or bonds
backed by a pool of assets of one tranche. This process is called subordination and 
divides credit risk among these tranches. The most senior tranches have the first claim 
on the cash-flows the SPV receive. In case of losses of the underlying assets they are 
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first applied to equity tranches. After an equity tranche is exhausted losses will impair 
the next senior tranche. The goal is to create highly demanded investment-grade notes
or bonds (senior tranches) with relatively low risk. 
The asset manager receives a predetermined fee from the SPV and manages the SPV’s 
portfolio of assets. The trustee enters into on trustee agreement with the SPV. The role 
of the trustee includes fiduciary responsibilities like ensuring compliance with the 
CDO’s requirements or that collateral quality and coverage test are met. While the task 
of the asset manager is advising and directing trades, the trustee carries them out. 
The servicer collects the interest and principal payments of the mortgage loans that are 
passed along to the SPV and handles delinquencies and foreclosures.  Typically there 
exist a master servicer and subservicer. Whether or not the investor is affected by a 
homeowner’s delinquency depends on whether the servicer is required to make 
advances. A back-up servicer is only used if the master servicer can not advance. If 
delinquency payments have been made or the property has been foreclosed the servicer 
recovers advances. The servicer can be legally obligated to advance, his advance can be 
limited but can also be voluntary. Due to their critical role rating agencies look carefully
at the quality of the servicer when assessing the credit risk of the nonagency MBS.
The CDO’s transaction can be categorized as a balance sheet or as an arbitrage 
transaction depending on the motivation of the originator. The motivation of a balance 
sheet transaction is to remove debt instruments from the balance sheet. Typically 
financial institutions use this type of transaction in order to reduce their capital 
requirements. In an arbitrage transaction the originator earns the spread between the 
yield received on the assets in the underlying pool and the payments made to the various 
tranches in the structure.
According to Kiff and Mills (2007) the major parts (80%) of a typical transaction are 
the AAA-rated Class A tranches. They serve a broad investor base of high-grade 
investors. Most of the remaining 20% of a typical mortgage securitization structure is 
comprised of so-called Class M or mezzanine tranches. The rest of below-mezzanine
14
tranches are usually either sold to hedge funds and investment banks or retained by the 
originator.
Why can a pooling and tranching of liabilities create value although these processes are 
costly? According to Ashcraft (2005) the answer is related to the presence of
imperfections in financial markets. Originating institutions might have more 
information about the potential cash flows from an asset pool than outside investors. In 
this case it may be better to issue a senior tranche that is at least partially secured 
against default and comparable to debt to lesser informed investors and a junior or 
equity tranche that is purchased by more informed investors or kept by the originating 
institution. Also because of the segmented financial markets, some investors demand 
highly rated instruments. Therefore it is attractive for financial institutions to create new 
assets with desirable characteristics for a particular investor class.
Fabozzi (2002) explained that almost all nonagency securities are credit enhanced, 
either internal or external, in order to protect higher-rated tranches of shortfalls in cash 
flows. External credit enhancements are third-party guarantees that provide first loss 
protection against losses up to a specific level like 10%. The most common forms of 
external credit enhancements are corporate guarantees, letters of credit, pool insurances
and bond insurances. With a letter of credit a fee is paid to a financial institution to 
provide a specific cash amount to compensate a cash shortfall of the cash-flows. Pool 
insurance policies cover losses resulting from defaults and foreclosures but not losses 
resulting from bankruptcy, fraud arising in the origination process, or special hazards. 
Bond insurance is not used as primary protection but to support other forms of credit 
enhancement. Investors realize a shortfall in the cash-flows in case of a default if the 
resulting net losses exceed the guarantee level. Reserve funds, over-collateralization, 
and senior/subordinated structures are the most common forms of internal credit 
enhancements. Reserve funds are deposits of cash generated from issuance proceeds 
and are typically invested in money market instruments. In the concept of over-
collateralization are the outstanding mortgage loans are worth more then the par value 
of the outstanding securities. This excess is used to compensate shortfalls in cash-flows.
15
An excess spread, which is the pool yield minus servicing fee, coupon interest and 
losses, is used in order to absorb losses. 
Rating agencies determine the level of credit enhancement. For example Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) begins with a prime pool that consists of at least 300 geographically 
diversified, fixed-rate, first lien mortgage loans that have 30 years maturity, full 
documentation and 80% loan-to-value ratio. For this prime pool S&P has statistics by 
rating for foreclosure frequency and loss severity. The product of these two indicators is 
the base case loss coverage. Finally, for every deviation from the prime pool criteria an 
adjustment has to be made. 
The subprime mortgage lender has an interest in selling the whole MBS off quickly 
because it raises cash that can be used to fund fresh subprime mortgage loans. In the 
CDO market it is easy for the investment bank to sell the senior tranches that are high 
investment-grade bond to investors. But what happens to the mezzanine and the equity 
tranches, which insiders sometimes call toxic waste7?
The investment bank might create a hedge fund that buys the equity tranches. In case of 
an increase in house prices that prevents borrowers from defaulting the value of the 
CDO equity increases as well. These hedge funds are often highly leveraged using the 
CDOs as collateral to get bank loans, which are invested in more CDOs of the 
investment bank.
An alternative possibility is that the investment bank keeps the highly risky mezzanine 
and equity tranches but insures itself by entering a credit default swap (CDS). Another 
financial institution receives the insurance premium paid by the investment bank for 
underwriting the risk of default of the underlying subprime mortgages. Since the 
insurance payments can be seen by the underwriting institution as a stream of income 
payments, these CDS streams can be once again aggregated to a pool and tranched into 
different risk profiles that are called synthetic CDOs.
7 See Tustain P.: Investment Landfill: How professionals dump their toxic waste on you, July 2, 2007, 
available at: http://goldnews.bullionvault.com/files/Investment_Landfill.pdf (visited December 3, 2007).
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Gibson (2004) defined synthetic CDOs as an outgrowth developed of cash flow CDOs. 
Unlike traditional cash flow CDOs, which have a reference portfolio made up of cash 
assets such as corporate bonds or loans, the reference portfolio of a synthetic CDO is 
made up of credit default swaps. Anson et al (2004) explained that in a cash flow CDO 
deal there is a transfer of ownership or true sale of the underlying assets to a legal entity
whereas in a synthetic securitization structure only the credit risk of the assets is 
transferred from the originator to the investors. Therefore a synthetic CDO is classified 
as a credit derivative where the investors are credit protection sellers and the originator 
is the credit protection buyer. Much of the risk transfer that occurs in the credit 
derivatives market is in the form of synthetic CDOs.
In general, a synthetic securitization has advantages over traditional cash flow structures 
like lower transaction costs because there is no necessity to set up an SPV or the 
banking relationships with clients can be maintained because loans stay on the balance 
sheet of the originating institution. A disadvantage of a synthetic CDO structure can be 
the need for an OECD bank to act as the swap counterparty to meet capital relief 
requirements like Figure 2 shows.
Figure 2: Synthetic CDO Structure
Source: Anson et al (2004)
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What are the potential risks investors have to take if they invest in subprime-related 
securities?
To analyse the return of a CDO backed by a pool of loans, potential investors have to 
consider three key factors which are:
 Default probabilities of individual loans and cumulative default rates
 Default correlations
 Recovery rates in case of default
These factors are usually provided by analysts like rating agencies. Returns on CDO
tranches can be simulated by viewing number and time of defaults up to maturity as 
well as the recovery rates as random variables that are modelled with a stochastic 
process. 
The main indicator of the default risk embedded in debt instruments is the rating which 
is provided by the credit-rating agency. This is based on expected loss or probability of 
default. Fender and Mitchell (2005) argued that the complexity of structured finance 
product increased the role of rating agencies as delegated monitors of debt instruments. 
Ammer and Clinton (2004) suggested that the reliance on ratings as credit information 
seems to be higher in structured finance than in traditional bond markets and they found 
that ABS downgrades have a stronger impact on prices than downgrades for corporate 
bonds have. Since structured finance ratings have become one of the fastest-growing 
business segments and a principle source of revenue, potential conflicts of interest based 
on issuer-paid fees might arise.
According to Anson et al (2004) the risks of investors who invest in synthetic CDOs are 
mainly the credit risk of the reference assets and the legal issues associated with the 
definition of credit events. The primary measure of the credit risk of the reference assets
is the credit rating of the assets, taken together with any credit enhancements, as well as 
their historical ratings performance. In general, the risk taken by investors in a synthetic 
CDO deals is higher than in a cash CDO deal because the hurdle for a credit event may 
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be lower than that for outright default. Therefore the probability of losses for a synthetic 
note of a specific rating may be higher than for a conventional note of the same rating.
To a smaller extent, there exists also the counterparty credit risk associated with the 
credit default swap that transfers the credit risk to the CDO structure.
Hayre (2001) stated that servicing risk addresses the concerns that the servicer will 
survive the full life of the securitization, the financial stability of the servicer and the 
servicing intensity of the collateral.
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3. The 2007 Crisis in the Financial Markets
The turmoil on the global financial markets in summer of 2007 was triggered by the
crisis in the U.S. market for subprime residential mortgages. First, I focus on recent 
developments on the U.S. subprime lending market and then I analyze how losses of 
mortgage-related securities caused panic in financial markets.
3.1. U.S. Subprime Market Crisis
In December 2006 and the beginning of the year 2007 several U.S. subprime lenders 
filed for bankruptcy. Later that year we saw a meltdown of the U.S. subprime mortgage 
market. What went wrong and what were the roots of the 2007 U.S. subprime market 
crisis? In this section I take a close look at the factors that have contributed to the 
hazardous developments in the subprime lending market. 
Despite borrower friendly underwriting criteria I examined in the previous section, 
favorable conditions on the residential housing market also contributed to the expansion 
of the subprime mortgage market.
1997 saw the beginning of a period of rapid house price appreciation that helped to 
increase volumes of subprime lending as well as poor underwriting quality and 
predatory tactics. Between 2000 and 2006 real home prices almost doubled according to 
the S&P/Case-Shiller® Home Price Index8. The development of the index can be seen 
graphically in Figure 3.
8 The S&P/Case-Shiller® Home Price Indices measures the residential housing market, tracking changes 
in the value of the residential real estate market in 20 metropolitan regions across the United States.
Data available at http://www.homeprice.standardandpoors.com (visited December 10, 2007).
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Figure 3: S&P/Case-Shiller® Home Price Index from 2000 to 2007
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Source: http://www.homeprice.standardandpoors.com
If the house value of a struggling borrower has appreciated, he could solve his financial 
problems temporarily by refinancing the mortgage. Cash could be withdrawn from the 
increased equity of the house and the new mortgage that was higher can be held for a 
while. Another option would be the sale of the house and the repayment of the loan 
principal. Appreciating house prices give borrowers an equity cushion. But in a period 
when equity was not created by house price appreciation, borrower’s financial 
shortcoming could no longer be hidden and default rate rose. 
The option to sell or refinance reduced payment delinquencies that are the forerunner of
default and foreclosure. Doms, Furlong and Krainer (2007) documented a strong 
negative correlation between delinquency rates and cumulative house price appreciation 
across metropolitan areas during 2006. This research also stated that house price 
appreciation significantly improved the performance of subprime loans. 
Additionally, Krinsman (2007) explained, interest rates were low in the period from 
2002 to 2005 and delinquency rates on subprime mortgage loans were at historically 
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low levels in the years 2004 and 2005. Due to these market conditions there were only 
moderate or low losses on defaulted nonconforming loans. The good performance of 
subprime loans might have masked potential problems in the subprime market and 
made it easier to convince investors that very few subprime loans would experience 
defaults or foreclosures. During the refinancing boom in the years 2002 and 2003 
borrowing demand increased because interest rates fell. Mortgage lenders expanded 
their business and new lenders were attracted and entered the market. 
Figure 4: Federal Funds Target Rate from 2001 to 2004
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The changes of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s intended federal funds rate from 2001 to 
2004 can be seen in Figure 4. It was lowered in 2001 and was kept low in the following 
three years. Taylor (2007) stated that during the period from 2003 to 2005 the federal 
funds rate had been well below of what experience of the good economic performance 
in the previous two decades would have predicted. The magazine The Economist wrote 
in the summer of 2007 that by slashing interest rates more than the Taylor rule 
prescribed, the Fed encouraged a house-price boom10.
9 Available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm
10 See Does America need a recession? The Economist, August 23, 2007, available at:  
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9687245 (visited January 19, 2008).
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The primary objective of some lenders was to increase the origination volume due to the 
fact that incentive structures were tied to the number of subprime loans closed. After 
origination subprime loans could generate profits through whole loans sales or funding 
through securitization. Krinsman (2007) concluded that the growth in the subprime 
lending business might have resulted in tremendous overcapacity. While the amount of 
total U.S. mortgage originations increased from $2215 billion in the year 2001 to $2980 
billion in the year 2006, subprime mortgage originations increased from $190 billions to 
$600 billions in the same time11. Figure 5 shows that the subprime share of total 
mortgage originations increased from about 8% in 2001 to 20% in 2006.
Figure 5: Subprime Share of Total Mortgage Originations from 2001 to 2006
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In the year 2006 things changed. The rise in interest rates from 2006 on and the 
slowdown on the U.S. housing market increased competition among mortgage lenders 
because the number of subprime borrowers that were qualified for a mortgage loan 
declined.
11 Data from Inside Mortgage Finance: The 2007 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Top Subprime 
Mortgage Market Players & Key Data, available at:
http://www.imfpubs.com (visited December 20, 2007).
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At the same time demand of institutional investors for subprime MBSs and ABSs with 
high yields was still strong. The pressure on subprime lenders to maintain origination 
volume and to meet the demand for subprime mortgage-related securities weakened the 
underwriting standards and borrowers were approved who otherwise might not have 
qualified for subprime loans. For this purpose underwriting standards have been relaxed 
and a typical subprime borrower could obtain a loan with little or no down-payment and 
by providing little or no documented proof of income or assets. 
Borrowers were expected to make at least a 20% down-payment on the purchase price 
of their home in order to finance the remaining amount, otherwise lenders required 
private mortgage insurances. In the years 2006 and 2007, in addition to a first mortgage 
for 80% of the total purchase price, a second mortgage or “piggyback” loan for the 
remaining 20% was made to the borrower in the form of a home equity loan or a home 
equity line of credit. Those piggyback loans typically had higher interest rates and were 
originated by different lenders. With a product that was called 80/20 loan the borrower 
did not have to make a down-payment and could finance the total purchase price of his 
home. Krinsman (2007) found out that in recent years subprime first mortgage loans
made with piggyback loans accounted for almost 50% in states that had the greatest 
home price increases. 
Additionally loans with a maturity beyond 30 years and so-called 2/28 and 3/27 hybrid 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) were originated. Those ARMs were largely sold to 
financially vulnerable borrowers without consideration for their ability to afford them. 
A typical 2/28 hybrid ARM has a fixed teaser interest rate during the initial two year 
period. After that period the rate is reset every six months based on an interest rate 
benchmark for example the London Interbank Bid Offered Rate (LIBOR). Because the 
LIBOR was rising since summer 2003 the resets caused payments increased by at least 
30%, to an amount that many borrowers could no longer afford. In the same period the 
U.S. Federal Reserve tightened the monetary policy. Figure 6 shows that the federal 
funds target rate has been increased from 1% in June, 2004 to 5.25% in July 2006. 
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Figure 6: Federal Funds Target Rate from June 2004 to July 2006
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As a consequence delinquency and foreclosure rates for subprime ARMs have risen
sharply. In a period of house price appreciation subprime borrowers could sell or 
refinance their homes to pay off their loans before they were reset to unaffordable rates. 
But in 2006 house prices began to decline indicating a housing market contraction. The 
decade of continuous house price appreciation appeared to end and the financial 
unsteadiness of the millions of borrowers would no longer be disguised.
The situation could be described as a bursting of a housing price bubble. A bubble can 
be referred to as a period of strong demand when prices are high only because market 
participants believe that prices will be high tomorrow and the price level deviates from 
the equilibrium level consistent with market fundamentals. The existence of a bubble in 
housing markets is controversial due to transaction and carrying costs associated with 
owning a house13.
Shiller (2007) stated that the boom in U.S. home prices since the late 1990s could be 
seen as a classical speculative bubble driven largely by extravagant expectations for 
12 Available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm
13 See e.g. Definition at Investopedia, available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/housing_bubble.asp (visited January 9, 2008).
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future price increases and that the situation might result in substantial declines in real 
home prices.
However if a housing price bubble does exist, shifts in expectations will have a dramatic 
impact on house price levels. Figure 7 shows the historic low of the Housing Market 
Index (HMI)14 from October to December 2007 that could be an evidence of a change in 
expectation about housing prices. The Housing Market Index is based on monthly 
surveys of a panel of homebuilders.
Figure 7: Housing Market Index from 2001 to 2007
Housing Market Index
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Source: The National Association of Home Builders
As a result, in 2006 almost 75% of nonagency securitized subprime mortgage 
originations were ARMs and in most cases 2/28 and 3/27 hybrid loans. Further the rate 
of serious delinquencies for ARMs rose sharply towards the end of 2006 and on March 
13, 2007 the Mortgage Bankers Association reported that almost 13% of subprime 
14 The National Association of Home Builders produces the Housing Market Index (HMI), a weighted, 
seasonally adjusted statistic derived from ratings for present single-family sales, single-family sales in the 
next six months and buyer’s traffic. A rating of 50 indicates that the number of positive or good responses 
received from the builders is about the same as the number of negative or poor responses. Ratings higher 
than 50 indicate more positive or good responses. Data available at: 
http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?sectionID=134&genericContentID=530 (visited January 9, 2008).
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borrowers were delinquent on their payments by 60 days or more. The foreclosure rate 
for subprime ARMs increased from 1.50% in the fourth quarter of 2004 to 3.23% in the 
first quarter of 200715.
3.2. Securitization Boom
In recent years there has been a boom in securitization. In this section I analyze what 
factors drove the demand for subprime-related securities and the rise of the global CDO 
market. Then I also discuss controversial issues of the boom in securitization.
Despite the increase of subprime mortgage originations after the year 2001 the demand 
for subprime-related securities increased as well. Figure 8 shows the share of securitized 
subprime mortgage originations of total subprime mortgage originations from in the 
period from 2001 to 200616.
15 See Schumer C. and Maloney C.: The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth, 
Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How We Got Here, Report and Recommendations by the 
Majority Staff of the Joint Economic Committee, October 2007, available at 
http://jec.senate.gov/Documents/Reports/10.25.07OctoberSubprimeReport.pdf (visited January 9, 2008).
16Data from Inside Mortgage Finance: The 2007 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Top Subprime 
Mortgage Market Players & Key Data, available at:
http://www.imfpubs.com (visited December 20, 2007).
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Figure 8: Share of Securitized Subprimes of Total Mortgage Originations from 2001 to 2006
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Whereas in the year 2001 half of the $190 billion of subprime mortgage originations 
were securitized in mortgage-backed securities, the share increased to 80% of the $600 
billion of subprime mortgage originations in 2006.
After 2001 not only interest rates declined, also spreads on corporate bonds continued to 
fall. From September 2001 to August 2005 the spreads on high-yield corporate bonds 
decreased by one fifth from 1653 basis points to 341 basis points17. Investment-grade 
corporate bonds had an average spread of 44 basis points in August 2005 which was 
about one third of the observed spread in October 2002. Spreads on CDO tranches were 
significantly higher than for corporate bonds with the same rating, so demand for asset-
backed securities has been created by investors. Higher spreads can be explained by the 
greater complexity of structured finance products or with the fact that returns on CDO
tranches are more volatile than returns on corporate bonds of the same rating 
documented by Perraudin and Van Landschoot (2004). 
17 See Financial Stability Review, Deutsche Bundesbank, November 2005, Page 135-144, available at:
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/finanzstabilitaetsberichte/200511.corporatebond.pd
f (visited January 15, 2008).
28
But the good performance of subprime-related securities and the decline of spreads in 
that period might have led to a situation, in which investors underestimated the potential 
risks of such investments. Higher spreads and good ratings of CDO tranches also
attracted many European banks. According to the Bank for International Settlements,
the credit-related derivatives rose by 568% from 2001 to 2004. That growth was almost 
5 times higher than the overall growth in over-the-counter derivatives18, but in this 
period risks have become increasingly under-priced.
Data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) show in 
Figure 9 the development of global CDO issuances from the year 2004 to the beginning 
of the year 2007. The total CDO issuance amounted $24.98 billion in the first quarter of 
2004 and increased by 640% in three years to $184.76 billion in the first quarter of 
2007.
Figure 9: Global CDO Market Total Issuance from 2004 to 2006
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The Data set consists of all kind of CDO issues mainly based on ABS but also on
leveraged loans, corporate bonds and other categories. In Figure 10 shows that global 
issuance of CDOs generated by cash flow streams account for a significantly larger part 
18 See Fornari F.: BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, June 2005, Page 41, 
available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0506.pdf (visited January 18, 2008).
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than synthetically founded CDO that use credit default swaps (CDS) to replicate cash 
flows rather than buying cash assets.
Figure 10: Global CDO Market Issuance by Motivation
Global CDO Market Issuance ($ Millions)
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According to Auerback (2007) excess capital of foreign investors in Asia and Central 
Europe denominated in U.S. dollars further increased the strong demand for investment-
grade U.S. debt. This excess capital pool derived either from petrodollars or from a 
massive trade surplus with the U.S. He stated that U.S. insurance companies and 
pension funds stopped buying subprime mezzanine CDOs that are 10-20 times levered 
special purpose vehicles consisting of only the BBB and BBB- tranches of subprime 
mortgage loans in late 2003. As a result issuers repacked a series of BBB tranches with 
a cascading cash waterfall and sold the senior tranches to investors in Asia and Central 
Europe. There had been orders from overseas investors to by any U.S. debt-related 
investment rated AAA and the credit rating agencies provided the most senior tranche 
this rating.
Despite the demand created by investors, Basel II also had an effect on securitization 
activities of financial institutions because it created a new framework for how they had 
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to measure and allocate capital against credit risk19. Under Basel II banks faced strong 
pressure to minimize their exposure to non-investment grade rated assets caused by the 
regulatory capital that banks had to hold against these positions. By selling risky assets 
to special purpose vehicles and creating CDO tranches, banks were able to remove them 
from their balance sheet and reduce their regulatory capital. Fitch Ratings reported that 
banks could face lower capital charges by investing in securitization structures with 
high ratings rather than by holding a comparable pool of unsecuritized assets directly. 
This was particularly true for mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and credit card asset-
backed securities (ABSs). The Basel II regulatory framework increased the 
securitization activities of financial institutions and how they structure their 
securitization deals.
The goal of securitization is to diversify risk by pooling diversified and uncorrelated 
assets and structuring this portfolio in several tranches with different risk exposure. 
CDOs are sold all over the world ensuring that risk is not concentrated in one region or 
among a particular group of investors. In the case of subprime mortgage loans, 
securitization offered riskier borrowers access to more credit than before because 
originators and intermediaries did not have to take credit, interest-rate and liquidity risk 
on their own books. Instead they could transfer those risks on to who look for longer-
term, higher-yielding assets20.
But what are the critical issues of this business model? Because CDO tranches are sold 
in private placements it is difficult to get the pressent values or information about the 
underlying portfolio. There is absolutely a lack of transparency. Pricing of CDO 
tranches can be done with complex models but model-implied credit spreads often are 
smaller than the observed market spreads. This underestimation of market spreads by 
the model is a restatement of the “credit spread puzzle” by Amato and Remolona 
(2003).
19 See Hansen M.: Basel II: The ‘Bottom-line’ Impact on Scuritization Markets, Risk Center, September 
14, 2007, available at: http://www.riskcenter.com/story.php?id=11459 (visited February 13, 2008).
20 See Wolf M.: Securitisation: Life after Death, Financial Times, October 2, 2007, available at:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8dd50650-70fc-11dc-98fc-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 (visited 
February 20, 2008).
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In CDO transactions, the monitoring and servicing of the underlying loans is task of the 
holder of the equity tranche because he will experience the first losses and has an 
incentive to keep a high level of quality of the loan portfolio. As long as the mortgage 
originator keeps the equity tranches, uninformed investors who hold a senior tranche 
can be sure that the originator maintains the loan portfolio quality. Krahnen (2007) 
stated that since equity tranches are sold off in CDO transactions, the market value of 
all outstanding tranches decreases because without knowing who is holding the equity 
tranche, investors have to be concerned about the mortgage market and about borrower 
monitoring21. But since investors were not able or not willing to do that the market 
collapsed. 
One has to keep in mind that a CDO transaction transfers but does not eliminate credit 
risk. Through diversification risk is reduced but in the case of subprime mortgage loans 
problems arose when CDO deals pooled similar assets, in this case MBSs or portfolios 
of subprime mortgage loans that are not uncorrelated.
Credit-rating agencies have played a significant role in the development of the market 
for structured finance products. They provide ratings for structured finance securities 
and assess the quality of the underlying assets. Investors rely on ratings provided by 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch which are currently the internationally 
recognized credit-rating agencies22. But there are potential conflicts of interest since 
these credit-rating agencies are paid by the issuers of the securities. Additionally credit-
rating agencies advise issuers of the structured finance securities on how to design 
structures that receive the best rating possible. High ratings are in the interest of the 
issuers and the assistance of the rating agencies to obtain them is of course remunerated. 
Bloomberg reported in July 2007 that 95% of the securities in the CDO receive 
investment-grade ratings and that these ratings gave no hint of what was in the debt 
package or that it might collapse although it was loaded with risky debt like subprime 
21 See Krahnen J.: Securitisation Crisis claims Causalities, The Banker, October 1, 2007, available at: 
http://www.thebanker.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/5249/Securitisation_crisis_claims_casualties.html?  
(visited February 12, 2008).
22 See Buiter W.: Basel II: back to the drawing board? Financial Times, September 21, 2007, available at: 
http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/09/basel-ii-back-t.html/ (visited February 15, 2008).
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mortgage loans23. The three largest credit rating agencies earned more money from 
evaluating structured finance products including CDOs and ABSs in 2005 and 2006 
than from rating anything else. The fees for rating CDO tranches are as much as three 
times higher than for rating bonds. Lund (2007) points out that the credit-rating 
agencies have a strong financial interest in the development of the market for structured 
products because it is a major source of income.
Rating agencies defend themselves by arguing that no investor should rely only on a 
credit rating or an opinion when making his investment decision.  
3.3. Credit Crunch
By the end of 2006 the credit quality deterioration of subprime mortgage borrowers 
became visible for investment banks, which reduced their purchase of nonconforming 
loans for CDO from lenders.
On March 13, 2007 The Wall Street Journal posted that a number of banks led by 
HSBC were trying to force small mortgage lenders to buy back some of the same loans 
the banks eagerly bought in 2005 and 2006, by enforcing what the industry calls 
repurchase agreements24. Due to the fact that subprime mortgage lenders were often 
thinly capitalized and dependent on their cash-flows more than 25 of them filed for 
bankruptcy during the first half of the year 2007. In almost every case, the subprime 
mortgage lender was a specialty finance lender and was not an institution with federally 
insured deposits. The repurchase agreements mentioned before became worthless in 
case of bankruptcy.
23 See Tomlinson R. and Evans D.: The Ratings Charade, Bloomberg, July 26, 2007, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/marketsmag/ratings.html (visited January 22, 2008).
24 See Mollenkamp C. and Smith J.: Banks Go on Subprime Offensive, The Wall Street Journal, March 
13, 2007, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117369890345734007.html?mod=mostpop (visited 
January 9, 2008).
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During the spring and summer of 2007 delinquency and default rates of subprime 
mortgages were higher than expected and investors had to re-evaluate their mortgage-
related securities. On June 23, 2007 Bear Stearns, one of the largest investment banks 
and security trading firms, announced to lend $3.2 billion to one of its two troubled 
hedge funds, which are heavily invested in subprime MBSs, in order to stave off the risk 
of a collapse of the fund.25 On July 10, 2007 Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s investor 
service announce a wave of downgrades on MBSs, an indicator that they might have 
misjudged the risk of these securities26. One week later Bear Stearns explained that the 
two hedge funds, the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Fund and the Bear 
Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leveraged Fund, have lost almost all 
their value as the MBSs downturn went global.27
Historically, U.S. mortgages have generally been perceived as among the most rock-
solid of investments, so these investments have been bought by investors from all over 
the world, especially from Europe. On July 30, 2007 it became known that the German 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank was in trouble because its subprime assets were declining 
in value. To calm down the local panic the German government stepped in with a 
bailout package on August 2 but the damage to credibility was already done. Reports by 
funds that their subprime exposure was minimal had no effects on investors who began 
pulling their money out of any investment that might be linked in any way to U.S. 
subprime mortgage loans. 
Around August 7, 2007 new stories built panic and investors didn’t differentiate
between subprime and prime mortgage loans any more and fears had spread to higher 
risk products in general. The uncertainty among credit market participants about the risk 
exposure to subprime mortgage CDOs or MBSs rose. Auerback (2007) explained that 
while risk could to some extend be priced by financial market participants, uncertainty 
simply could not. Now it became evident how difficult the task of evaluating the risks 
of structured financial products was and that there was only minimal pricing 
25 See Year-End Timeline – Second Quarter, The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2008, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119879374267153845.html (visited January 3, 2008).
26 See Year-End Timeline – Third Quarter, The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2008, available at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119884951243255571.html January 3, 2008
27 For more Details see Timeline in the Apprendix
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transparency. This true uncertainty caused a panic in credit markets and market 
participants stopped buying private debt instruments, also those which were not related 
to subprime mortgages, or demanded higher interest rate risk premiums. As a result the
entire commercial paper market stopped functioning. Risk premiums, which had been
trending down in recent years, rose sharply28 relative to riskless U.S. Treasury 
securities. Analysts compared the situation with a minefield, no one knew where the 
mines were planted and that they were trying to stumble through it29. Therefore a local 
quality problem in the U.S. subprime mortgage market triggered a near-shutdown of the 
commercial paper and the interbank lending market on August 9, 2007 and the days 
afterwards. The increasing desire for financial risk came to an abrupt end. 
In the first two weeks of August 2007, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, 
the Bank of Japan, and other central banks pumped tens of billions of short-term 
liquidity into the banking system in order to stem the panic that had to do with 
unpriceable uncertainty rather than measurable risk. The Federal Reserve cut the 
discount rate, which is the interest rate charged on a bank when it borrows funds, and 
the federal funds rate that banks charge other banks on interest loans. Also the European 
Central Bank and other central banks cut the interest rate charged on borrowing banks. 
All of these actions have been taken to prevent the crisis affecting other financial 
markets.
While lower rated subprime CDO tranches were in trouble since the beginning of the 
year 2007 also AAA-rated tranches started to fall in value in August. Since it is difficult 
to find an indicator of CDO tranches market prices the Markit ABX family of indices 
could be a performance measure. The performance of the 2007 ABX indices for 
different ratings from January to November of the year 2007 can be seen in Figure 11. 
AAA-rated papers lost almost 20% of their value and credit-rating agencies started to
downgrade them. The fear of downgrades led to a wave of sales, because many 
institutional investors are allowed to hold only AAA-rated securities.
28 See King A.: The Subprime Crash, OCRegister.com, August 26, 2007, available at: 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8669 (visited February 20, 2008).
29 See Auerback M.: Risk vs Uncertainty: The Cause of the Current Financial Crisis, Japan Policy 
Research Institute, Occasional Paper No. 37, October 2007, available at: 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op37.html (visited February 22, 2008).
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Figure 11: Performance of Subprime-related Securities
Source: Markit
In the last week of August the German government had to rescue another savings bank 
with exposure to structured credit markets, the Sachsen LB with a €17.3bn ($23.3bn)
bail-out. The Sachsen LB supported and managed a special investment fund, an asset-
backed commercial paper conduit that borrowed in the short-term commercial paper 
market and invested on longer-term asset-backed instruments. Problems arose when 
commercial paper investors refused to finance the conduit and Sachsen LB was unable 
to provide the credit it had pledged.
In September 2007 RealtyTrac Inc. reported that U.S. home foreclosure filings surged to 
243000 in August 2007. This means that foreclosure filings increased by 115 % from 
August 2006 and by 36% from July 2007. It was also the highest number of foreclosure 
filings since RealtyTrac began tracking monthly filings. The foreclosure filing rate in 
the U.S. was one in every 510 homes at that time. The Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, agreed
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to relax restrictions on the investment holdings of mortgage finance companies. This 
enabled Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy $20 billion more in subprime mortgages.30
Also in Europe thing were getting worse for some financial institutions. On September 
15, 2007 the shares of United Kingdom lender Northern Rock PLC fell 31% after it 
disclosed that it was forced to turn to emergency funding from the Bank of England. 
Customers withdrew more than $2 billion accelerating the fall of shares. On October 1, 
2007 the Swiss bank UBS said that it had to write down $3.41 billion in fixed-income 
assets, including securities tied to subprime mortgages31. 
On October 18, 2007 Standard & Poor’s cut the credit ratings on $23.35 billion of 
securities backed by pools of home loans that were offered to borrowers during the first 
half of the year. The downgrades even hit securities rated AAA. At the beginning of 
November U.S. bank Citigroup announced that despite a $5.9 billion write-down 
reported in early October it has to take an additional $8 billion to $11 billion write-
down related to subprime mortgages. Two days later Citigroup bailed out seven 
affiliated structured-investment vehicles and brought $49 billion in assets onto its 
balance sheet. One month later Swiss UBS announced that it has to take new $10 billion 
write-downs related to U.S. subprime mortgages and it may record a full-year loss in 
2007. The announcement made the group the biggest victim of the crisis to date among 
European banks32. UBS also announced it has solicited a cash infusion of $11.5 billion 
from GIC, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, and an unknown Middle Eastern 
investor.
Accumulated subprime write-downs of major financial institutions until the end of 
March 2008 are listed in Table 1.
30 See Schumer C.: The Subprime Mortgage Market Timeline, Joint Economic Committee, January 2008, 
available at: http://jec.senate.gov/Documents/Reports/01%2023%2008%20subprime%20timeline.pdf
(visited February, 2008).
31 See Year-End Timeline – Fourth Quarter, The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2008, available at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119885527558455711.html?mod=JR-Year-End-Review-2007 (visited 
January 4, 2008).
32 See Hurst A.: UBS writes down $10 bln, Singapore injects capital, Reuters, December 10, 2008, 
available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSL1049891520071210?sp=true (visited January 8, 
2008).
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Table 1: Losses caused by Subprime Loans or Subprime-related Securities
Financial Institution $billions
UBS 37.4
Merril Lynch 22.1
Citigroup 21.1
HSBC 17.2
Morgan Stanley 9.4
Deutsche Bank 7.1
Bank of America 5.3
Bear Stearns 3.2
JP Morgan Chase 3.2
BayernLB 3.2
Barcleys 2.6
IKB 2.6
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 2.6
Credit Suisse 2
Source: BBC News33
It can be seen that although the crisis caused by American homeowners many European 
banks are among the biggest victims, on top the Swiss UBS.
To help struggling homeowners and markets the Federal Reserve started a series of 
reductions of their intended federal funds rate that is summarized in Figure 12. But the 
troubles in the credit markets affected equity prices in stock exchanges around the 
world. Unknown losses on bank balance sheets caused a steep sell-off in global equity 
markets. The performance of major stock indices can be seen in the next section. 
33 See UBS doubles subprime writedowns, BBC News, April 1, 2008, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7323809.stm (visited April 6, 2008).
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Figure 12: Federal Funds Target Rate from August 2007 to March 2008
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Source: Federal Reserve34
After stock markets all over suffered huge losses on Monday January 21, 2008 the 
Federal Reserve responded on January 22, 2008 with a three-quarter percentage-point 
cut in the target for the federal-funds rate to 3.5%35. This cut was the biggest trim in 20 
years. But fears of a recession in the U.S. were mounting. The announcement stopped 
the free fall of the stock markets, but they remained highly volatile the days after. On 
Wednesday January 30, 2008 the Federal Reserve lowered the target for short-term 
interest rates by a half percentage-point to 3%.
Bond insurers came under pressure too. They guarantee repayment of interest on a 
variety of debt securities in case of default in return for a premium. In the past decade 
they moved from insuring municipal bonds to structured finance products. The New 
York Times reported on January 24, 2008 that the two largest U.S. bond insurance 
companies, Ambac Financial Group and MBIA, have guaranteed buyers against losses 
34 Available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm
35 See Ip G.: Fed Rate Cuts Halts Market Fee Fall, But Recession Fears Are Mounting, The Wall Street 
Journal, January 23, 2008, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120100837976106391.html?mod=economy_lead_story_lsc (visited 
January 23, 2008).
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on more than $1 trillion of bonds36. Insurance regulators and major banks met and 
discussed ways to help insurers by injecting fresh capital. Fitch Ratings downgraded 
Ambac from AAA to AA level reflecting the significant uncertainty with respect to the 
company’s business model and strategy37. Without its AAA credit rating the Ambac 
might be unable to write top-ranked bond insurance, which makes up 74% of its 
revenue. The downgrade further raised doubt on the ratings of municipal and structured 
debt guaranteed by Ambac and accounted for almost $556 billion.
Investors turned their back on complex debt structures. According to the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) global CDO issues dropped from 
the peak of $184.8 billion in the first quarter by 83% to $29.9 billion in the fourth 
quarter of the year 2007, which can be seen in Figure 13. Reuters reported that business 
analysts describe CDOs as the dinosaurs of the subprime crisis and that the business 
model of repacking residential mortgage-backed securities in CDOs has vanished38.
36 See Bajaj V. and Anderson J.: Next on the Worry List: Shaky Insurers of Bonds, The New York Times, 
January 24, 2008, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/24/business/24bonds.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (visited March 12, 2008).
37 See Richard C.: Ambac’s Insurance Unit Cut to AA from AAA by Fitch Ratings, Bloomberg, January 
19, 2008, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=asLtTQyLRQQs&refer=home (visited 
March 12, 2008).
38 See Baird J. and Webb Q.: Cash CDO Issuance drops 83 pct in Q4 –SIFMA, Reuters, February 1, 2007, 
available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/newIssuesNews/idUSL0153153620080201 (visited February 
15, 2008).
40
Figure 13: Global CDO Market Total Issuance in 2007
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Hedge funds were also hit by problems with subprime-related securities, because they 
hold more than 45% of all CDO assets, according to the International Monetary Fund39.
Over the past few years, hedge funds, which are lightly regulated investment 
partnerships for wealthy and institutional investors, have become important vehicles to 
develop wealth. The world-wide total assets that were managed by hedge funds 
increased from $490 billion in the year 2000 to $1.9 trillion by summer 200740. They 
often had a marvellous track record of beating the market with highly complex trades. 
But as the credit crunch hit financial markets this opacity hurt hedge funds since 
investors who hear news about financial institutions were afraid of bad trading bets and 
pulled their money out. Additionally, the fact that hedge funds are often highly 
leveraged put pressure on their returns because banks cut their lending or made it more 
expensive to borrow. The Wall Street Journal reported on February 23, 2008 that in the 
year 2007 the shares of Fortress Investment Group LLC, a U.S. asset management firm 
who manages hedge funds, declined by 50%. Further Citigroup announced a bailout of 
an in-house hedge-fund group that lost on speculative bets and in January 2008 alone 
39 See Credit markets: CDOh no! The Economist, November 8, 2007, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10113339 (visited February 26, 2008).
40 See Zuckerman G.: Hedge Funds Feel New Heat, The Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2008, available 
at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120373510155387833.html (visited February 26, 2008).
41
so-called quantitative hedge fell 6% as a group, according to data-tracker Hedge Fund 
Research Inc.
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4. Impact on Austria
Unlike German or Swiss banks, Austrian banks stated that they have no exposure to 
U.S. subprime-related securities. They claimed that because of their growth 
opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe there was no money left to invest 
elsewhere. 
The biggest bank in Austria, the Erste Bank der oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG had to 
write down €20 million in the third quarter41. In December 2007 the magazine Format
published that the Austrian federal railways Österreichische Bundesbahnen had to write 
down up to €60 million on subprime-related securities that year. They had sold a 
portfolio of accounts receivables worth €612.9 million in a credit default swap 
transaction and had bought a portfolio of 200 ABSs and CDOs in order to diversify 
risks in 200542.
The Central Bank of Austria stated in March, 2008 that losses related to the 
international financial crisis of all Austrian banks account €1 billion. Because of 
increased profits, this amount should not cause any problems. In 2007 banks in Austria 
had to write down €325 million losses of subprime-related securities43. 
4.1. Rise and Fall of the Austrian Traded Index (ATX)
But what was the impact on the Vienna Stock Exchange? To understand this situation, a 
long term view has to be taken into consideration. The Austrian Traded Index (ATX) 
was published in 1991 for the first time and became the first leading index of the 
41 See Erste Bank: Mit leichten Kratzern aus der Kreditkrise, DiePresse.com, October 30, 2007, available 
at: http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/boerse/340084/index.do (visited January 17, 2008).
42 See US-Hypothekenkrisi holt ÖBB ein, Kurier, December 3, 2007, available at: 
http://www.kurier.at/nachrichten/wirtschaft/125693.php (visited January 17, 2008).
43 See Krise belastet Österreichs Banken mit einer Milliarde, Der Standard, March 28, 2008, available at: 
http://derstandard.at/?url=/?id=3281709 (visited March 29, 2008).
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Vienna Stock Exchange containing of the 20 largest and most actively-traded stocks on 
the exchange44. After years of ups and downs the ATX started its rally and rose from 
1150 index points in January 2003 to the all-time high of almost 5000 index points in 
June 2007. In this period the ATX had a double-digit annual growth rates that were 
34.7% in the year 2003, 41.9% in 2004, 42.1% in 2005 and 15.9% in 200645. 
Figure 14 shows the relative performance of the ATX compared with other major stock 
indices like the Deutscher Aktien Index (DAX) that is Germany’s blue-chip stock 
market index of the 30 major stock companies traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange; 
the Swiss Market Index (SMI) which is Switzerland’s blue-chip stock market index 
consisting of the 20 largest and most liquid stock listed on the Swiss Exchange; the 
FTSE 100 which is the stock market index of the 100 largest stocks listed on the 
London Stock Exchange and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) which consists 
of the 30 largest stock companies of the United States. 
Figure 14: Stock Indices from January 2003 to June 2007
Stock Indices from January 2003 to June 2007
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Source: finance.yahoo.com
44 See History of Wiener Börse, available at: 
http://en.wienerborse.at/static/cms/sites/wbag/media/en/pdf/about/history.pdf (visited January 19, 2008).
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From January 2003 to June 2007 the ATX clearly outperformed the other four stock 
market indices. 
The driver of this incredible performance was what in German is called Ost Fantasie. 
The European Union enlargement story offered Austrian companies new markets 
beyond the eastern border. More than two thirds of the companies listed on the Vienna 
Stock Exchange have business connections with the economic area between Prague, 
Budapest and Zagreb46. Banks and insurance companies in particular are heavily 
invested in Eastern Europe but also the OMV, Austria’s largest oil-producing and 
refining company has important activities in Eastern and Central European countries.
As growth opportunities were becoming fewer in global equity markets, investors were 
searching for alternative markets and looked east. Due to the fact that stocks were more 
liquid and less volatile in general than those on Eastern Europe stock exchanges, the 
Austrian equity market was an ideal entry point. If global equity markets were expected 
to gain between 5% and 10% in one year the return on the Austrian market was 
expected to be between 10% and 15% because of the pickup of exposure to Eastern and 
Central Europe.
But the panic on financial markets and the resulting sale hit the Vienna Stock Exchange 
very hard. The following chart shows graphically the relative performance of the ATX 
compared with the DAX, SMI, FTSE and DJIA in the time from July 2, 2007 to 
February 1, 2008.
46 See Wall B.: Austria booming amid EU enlargement, International Herald Tribune, May 10, 2005, 
available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/09/business/gfcolumn.php?page=1 (visited February 7, 
2008).
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Figure 15: Stock Indices from July 2007 to January 2008
Stock Indices from July 2007 to January 2008
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Source: finance.yahoo.com
The ATX fell in the period from July 9, 2007 to January 23, 2008 by 30%. In the same 
time the DAX declined by 22%, the SMI by 23%, the FTSE by 18% and the DJIA by 
10%.
Why was the sell off on Austria’s equity market as a result of the financial crisis much 
larger than on stock exchanges the U.S. although U.S. subprime mortgages triggered 
stock markets turmoil and Austrian banks claimed that they did not suffer large 
subprime-related securities losses?
The Austrian stock market could not escape global developments.  After problems on 
the U.S. subprime mortgage market became known, share prices of financial institutions 
all over the world dropped since investors did not know who was affected by losses 
caused by subprime-related securities. The ATX had a high exposure on the banking 
sector since the Erste Bank der österreichischen Sparkassen AG and the Raiffeisen 
International Bank Holding AG made up 26% of the index47. 
Further Voestalpine AG (8.6% of the ATX), an international steel company; 
Wienerberger, the world’s largest producer of bricks (4.5% of the ATX) and 
47 http://www.indices.cc/cgi-bin/indizes.pl?index=ATX&lang=5 Feburary 7, 2008
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STRABAG SE (3.8% of the ATX), a European construction company would be 
affected by an economic downturn caused by rising fears of a recession in the U.S. 
because they highly depend on the business cycle.
4.2. Correlation Analysis of the ATX
In this section I take a look at the co-movements of the ATX and four equity market 
indices, Germany’s DAX, Switzerland’s SMI, the U.K.’s FTSE and the American Dow 
Jones Industrial Average.
The benefits from an international diversification of an investor’s portfolio depend on 
low correlations among international equity markets (Levy and Sarnat 1970). But in 
difficult times after stock crashes, financial crisis or global market corrections these 
correlations change. Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) stated that the degree of 
international co-movements among stock price indices has increased substantially after 
the international equity market crash in October 1987. Meric and Meric (1997) 
confirmed these findings in their long-term analysis and concluded that co-movements 
of U.S. and European equity markets had become closer after the crash, reducing 
portfolio diversification benefits.
Whether or not the U.S. subprime crises caused an international financial crisis or a 
market correction, I analyse if the correlation of the ATX with international equity 
markets changed from the first half of the year 2007 to the second half of the year 2007.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Equity Market Indices from 1.1.2007 to 31.7.2007
ATX DAX SMI FTSE DJIA
ATX 1 0.7755 0.7737 0.7694 0.3856
DAX 0.7755 1 0.8776 0.8952 0.5189
SMI 0.7737 0.8776 1 0.8558 0.4604
FTSE 0.7694 0.8952 0.8558 1 0.5100
DJIA 0.3856 0.5189 0.4604 0.5100 1
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Equity Market Indices from 1.8.2007 to 31.12.2007
ATX DAX SMI FTSE DJIA
ATX 1 0.7884 0.8027 0.8516 0.2859
DAX 0.7884 1 0.8013 0.8611 0.3433
SMI 0.8027 0.8013 1 0.8677 0.4083
FTSE 0.8516 0.8611 0.8677 1 0.4442
DJIA 0.2859 0.3433 0.4083 0.4442 1
The correlation matrices Table 2 and Table 3 show the correlation coefficients of the 
equity market indices in the period from 1.8.2007 to 31.12.2007 and from 1.8.2007 to 
31.12.2007 respectively. 
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients of the ATX with other Equity Market Indices
Equity Market 
Index 1.1.2007 - 31.7.2007 1.8.2007 - 31.12.2007 Change 
DAX 0.775454341 0.788432474 1.67%
SMI 0.773746738 0.802662013 3.74%
FTSE 0.769413488 0.851638555 10.69%
DJIA 0.385620072 0.285876177 -25.87%
The changes from the first to the second half of the year 2007 are summarized in Table 
4. It can be seen that the correlation coefficients between the Austrian equity market and 
other European equity markets increased in the second half of the year 2007 whereas 
the correlation between the ATX and the DJIA decreased48.
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients of the DJIA with European Equity Market Indices
Equity Market 
Index 1.1.2007 - 31.6.2007 1.8.2007 - 31.12.2007 Change 
ATX 0.3856 0.2859 -25.87%
DAX 0.5189 0.3433 -33.85%
SMI 0.4604 0.4083 -11.32%
FTSE 0.5100 0.4442 -12.90%
48 Correlation Coefficients calculated on the basis of daily log-returns. Data from 
http://finance.yahoo.com.
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Table 5 shows that all correlation coefficients of the DJIA with the four analyzed 
European equity market indices decreased significantly in the second half of the year
2007. In case of the U.S. equity market there is no increase of co-movements with 
international equity markets like it has been documented for the October 1987 crash. I 
observed that the DJIA declined less in the period form July 2007 to January 2008 than 
the other European equity market indices, so the impact of the credit crunch on stock 
markets was higher in Europe than in the U.S. even though market turmoil was caused 
by U.S. subprime mortgages.
4.3. Austrian Economic Outlook 
The Austrian economy grew by 3.4% in the year 2007 but in 2008 GDP growth will 
decelerate to 2.4% according to the December 2007 estimates of the Institute for 
Advanced Studies (IHS) or 2.2% according to the Austrian Institute of Economic 
Research (Wifo)49. In March 2008 both institutes corrected their predictions to 2.1% 
GDP growth for the year 200850. The Austrian economy will slow down but the growth 
rate will be still above the average rate of 2% in the Eurozone. Karl Aiginger, president 
of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research believes that the U.S. economy is not as 
important for Austria as it was before. He sees growth potential in India, China and 
other emerging markets. But the prospects for Austria’s most important export market, 
Germany, are pessimistic. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) adjusted 
its prediction for 2008 GDP growth to 1.7% from 2.5% in the first half of the year 2007. 
For the economists, this is only an interruption of the economic expansion that was 
ongoing for three years. They believe that after the shocks on financial markets 
disappear, expansion will continue in the second half of the year 2008 and 2009. 
49 See Wirtschaftswachstum: Der Konjunkturhimmel trübt sich ein, Die Presse, December 20, 2007, 
available at: http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/economist/350180/index.do (visited March 19, 2008).
50 See Finanzkrise und Preisexplosion bremsen Wirtschaft ein, Der Standard, March 28, 2008, available 
at: http://derstandard.at/ (visited March 28, 2008).
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The unemployment rate in Austria won’t decrease any longer due to the economic 
prospective but will remain at 4.3% in the following year51. A real problem will be 
headline inflation. The institutes predict that the rate of inflation will be above 3% in the 
first half of the year 2008. The rate of inflation will fall in the second half but for the 
whole year 2008 we won’t see the rate under 2.6% (Wifo) or 2.4% (IHS). The main 
drivers of inflation are high energy, commodity and food prices. Prices of nearly all 
commodities increased during 2007 and crude oil prices hit all-time-highs in autumn
2007 and again in the beginning 2008 with a price over $100 per barrel. Inflation and 
uncertainty about future economic developments caused by the volatility on financial 
markets will reduce private consumption and will lead to a relative low contribution of 
private consumption to GDP growth52.
For Austrian small and medium enterprises, it will be tough to raise funds in the 
foreseeable future. The U.S. subprime crisis caused a crisis on financial markets and the 
uncertainty led to a repricing of risks. The number of initial public offerings on the 
Vienna Stock Exchange during the year 2008 will be smaller compared with previous 
years and some were already cancelled because it is probably not the best idea to sell 
new shares when markets are volatile and fragile. And since banks need to fill up their 
equity because of write downs and have to re-evaluate and re-price their assets bank 
loans getting more expensive. Additionally because spreads on banks to refinance 
themselves and liquidity premiums remain high, corporate credit spreads will do the 
same. The credit crunch will affect businesses that need to finance large projects, real 
estate acquisitions or takeovers as well as venture capital and private equity 
corporations because they depend heavily on bank loans. To qualify for bank loans 
businesses have to optimize their balance sheets, increase their creditworthiness and 
accept that they have to pay a higher price. Banks may also break up with clients that 
51 Unemployment rate calculated by Eurostat definition. The Austrian calculation is higher.
52 See Österreich: Wirtschaftswachstum 2007 leicht gebremst, Die Presse, Freburary 14, 2007, available
at: http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/economist/362907/index.do?from=simarchiv (visited March 19, 
2007).
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have bad credit histories. Higher credit spreads indicate a higher probability of default; 
therefore market participants believe that the year 2008 will be turbulent53. 
53 See Unternehmensfinanzierung im Schatten der Subprime-Krise. Pressegespräch zum "Industrie 
aktuell"-Industrieforum 1/2008, FinanzNachrichten.de, March 13, 2008, available at: 
http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2008-03/artikel-10336677.asp (visited March 19, 2008).
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5. Future Prospects
What are the future prospects of the U.S. market for residential subprime mortgages, the 
U.S. economy and the banking industry after the international financial crisis? Do these 
market developments have an impact on the world economy?
5.1. Subprime Lending 
Kriensman (2007) stated that the interest rates for an estimated 882000 subprime ARMs 
originated during and after 2004 will reset in 2008 to higher payment rates causing the 
volume of subprime delinquencies and defaults to rise substantially and therefore put 
downward pressure on the house prices. Beside outstanding hybrid subprime mortgage 
loans there are many other subprime borrowers who are also at high risk of default. The 
resets on subprime ARMs in the near future will cause higher monthly payments that 
strain or exceed many borrowers’ budget. The volume of credit available will be 
reduced by tighter lending standards and the slumping U.S. housing market will affect 
the ability to refinance of subprime borrowers with little home equity. Though prices of 
new homes will remain low the next months only borrowers with excellent credit 
scores, employment histories and substantial equity can take an advantage from these 
developments. 
Foreclosures could have a significant impact in a community, in which the foreclosed 
property is located. A concentration of home foreclosures in a neighborhood hurts 
property values in several ways like a reduction of sales for businesses or reduced rental 
income for landlords. Additionally like Apgar, Duda and Gorey (2005) documented 
homes left vacant by foreclosure lower the desirability of the neighborhood because 
there is often an increase in crime associated with vacant houses. Immergluck and 
Smith (2006) found that conventional foreclosures have a statistically and economically 
significant effect on nearby property values. 
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In August 2007, the President of the U.S.A. George Bush announced a private sector 
plan to combat the rising wave of home foreclosures and to help struggling American 
homeowners. The president and his Administration assembled a private-sector group 
called the HOPE NOW Alliance. On December 6, 2007 representatives of HOPE NOW 
presented a plan under which up to 1.2 million U.S. homeowners could be eligible for 
assistance54. The HOPE NOW plan was designed to help subprime borrowers who can 
at least afford the current, starter rate of their hybrid adjustable rate mortgage, but who 
will be unable to make higher payments once the interest rates go up. The members of 
the HOPE NOW Alliance have agreed on a set of new industry-wide standards to help 
struggling borrowers in either refinancing an existing loan into a new private mortgage 
or freezing their current interest rates for five years. Additionally the ability of the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was expanded to offer refinancing to 
homeowners who have good credit histories but cannot afford their current payments. 
By the end of 2008, the FHA expected to have helped more than 300000 families. The 
FHA also started to charge insurance premiums based on the individual risk of each 
loan, using traditional underwriting standards. With this risk-based pricing the FHA is 
able to help even more low-to-moderate income families who otherwise have no access 
to prime-rate financing.
On March 4, 2008 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said in a speech to the 
Independent Community Bankers of America that the current focuses on reducing the 
monthly payments of U.S. homeowners by modifying their mortgage rates does not 
solve the underlying problem55. The dilemma is the increasing number of American 
homes that are worth less than their mortgage. With this negative equity a struggling 
borrower has less ability and less financial incentive to remain in his home. By the end 
of 2006, 7% of all mortgage borrowers had a negative equity. Economists from 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley estimated that this proportion will rise 
up to 21% if home prices fall 15% as they are expected to. Mr. Bernanke suggested that 
principal reductions that restore some equity for the homeowner might be relatively 
54 See Bush’s Outline for Homeowner Aid, The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2007, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119697097999116122.html (visited March 6, 2008).
55 See Ip G.: Bernanke’s Call: Aid Homeowners, The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2008, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120463882742910281.html (March 6, 2008).
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more effective to avoid delinquency and foreclosure. He also proposed that the FHA 
should be given more power to insure troubled mortgages.
Federal banking regulators have tightened guidance on non-traditional and hybrid 
adjustable rate mortgage lending in August 2007. But one problem is that because of the 
fragmented nature of U.S. financial regulation, observance and enforcement of such 
standards is not uniform. Regulators can enforce compliance by their regulated 
institutions. Since non-bank lenders and mortgage loan brokers are regulated at the state 
level, such initiatives rely on consistent state-level enactment and enforcement too56. 
The whole oversight framework on subprime mortgage lending might need to be 
reconsidered. Another challenging task within the U.S. regulatory and legal framework 
is to improve effective consumer protection against fraud and predatory lending in the 
originate-to-securitize financial model in the future. 
5.2. U.S. Economy
A large decline of the U.S. house prices reduces growth and employment because it 
reflects a decline in demand for new housing and therefore construction activity will 
decline as well, pushing smaller builders out of business. The whole U.S. building 
industry, which makes up 15% of the U.S. economy, expects to cut output by one half 
and that about one million workers will lose their jobs57. A lower level of household
wealth either caused by struggling homeowners or by rising unemployment lead to 
lower consumption, all other things being equal. But Mishkin (2007) argues that these 
effects occur with significant time lags.
56 See Kiff J. and Mills P.: Lessons from Subprime Turbulence, IMF Survey Magazine, International 
Monetary Fund, August 23, 2007, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/RES0823A.htm (visited March 18, 2008).
57 See The US sub-prime crisis in graphics, BBC News, November 21, 2007, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7073131.stm (visited March 5, 2008).
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According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. economy grew with an 
annual rate of 0.6% in the fourth quarter of the year 200758. 
Figure 16: U.S. Annual Growth Rate from 2001 to 2007
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Figure 16 shows that during the year 2007 the U.S. economy expanded at an inflation 
adjusted rate of 2.2%, which is the lowest gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in 
the past five years. The credit crunch further increases the U.S. economic downturn 
because banks and other lenders are cutting back on how much credit they will make 
available. They have tightened standards for loans since the wholesale bond market 
dried up and because their own balance sheets were affected by the crisis. Additionally 
rising losses forced banks to reduce lending to businesses, which weakens the 
economy’s prospects. There would be no effect if capital markets were perfect because 
instead of borrowing from banks, those who need funds could issue securities. But in 
the real world a drop in bank lending affects overall access to finance. This is 
particularly true with this crisis since there has also been a sharp drop in securitisation59.
58 See Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2007, Bureau of Economic Analysis, February 28, 2008, 
available at: http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm (visited March 5, 2008).
59 See The credit crisis: Crunch Numbers, The Economist, March 6, 2008, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10809394 (visited March 8, 2008).
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Greenlaw et. al (2008) tried to estimate mortgage-related losses with three different 
methods. Although each method involved some assumptions all three approaches 
yielded similar results that the losses were likely to be around $400 billion. They also 
estimated in their paper a drop in lending of $910 billion that would drag down the GDP 
growth by 1.3 percentage points over the year 2008.
Nobody can tell how long the slowdown of the U.S. economy, which is consumer 
driven, will last. Falling housing wealth and a weaker job market will decrease the 
spending of U.S. households and put pressure on the growth rate the next months.
Although the U.S.A. have become less central to global growth in the year 2007, it is 
still a big importer. Therefore a hard landing of the U.S. economy will affect the rest of 
the rich world60. 
5.3. Banking Industry
The subprime mortgage crisis caused huge losses in the U.S. and European banking 
industry. Although banks announced losses up to $60 billion by November 21, 2007
because subprime-related securities have fallen in value, the losses could be much 
bigger. CDO tranches are typically originated by special purpose vehicles (SPV), which 
are not owned by banks but banks might be forced to cover any bad debt that they 
accrue.
Uncertainty about losses forced banks to reduce the amount of money they lend each 
other because they feared not receiving the funds back. The result was a sudden 
reduction in the availability of loans and other types of credit from banks and financial 
markets and an increase in the cost of obtaining a loan which can be referred to as a 
60 See The global economy: The turning point, The Economist, September 20, 2007, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9831159 (visited March 9, 2008).
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credit crunch61. Although central banks increased the supply of money the situation did
not improve. 
If the credit crunch deepens and broadens further it will become a serious threat for 
banks or brokers. Liquidity problems and a lack of confidence that increases 
counterparty risk can quickly turn into a solvency crisis62. This is especially true for 
U.S. investment banks that rely pretty much on short-term lending and do not have 
access to the Fed’s discount window because they are not depository institutions.  
Market participants may also have to reconsider ratings provided by credit-rating 
agencies in the future. But this means that regulatory frameworks like Basel II need to 
be adjusted too. Pillar 1 of the proposed Basel II framework defines the minimum 
capital requirements for financial institutions. Using the standard approach to calculate 
those requirements they rely on ratings from credit-rating agencies. Under the internal 
rating-based approach, methods have to be developed for marking to model illiquid 
instruments that are not traded. But provided ratings on complex structured products 
and models used by banks are not trusted anymore. 
Investors have placed excessive trust in ratings on structured debt instruments provided 
by the credit rating agencies. Since the rating technology for corporate risk is 
fundamentally different from the one used for structured credit the results that are the 
rating should not have been put on the same scale because that implies similar potential 
losses63. To avoid confusion among investors in the future, ratings for the different 
types of obligations should be clearly distinguished.
Regulators in advanced economies will have to discuss reforms to rebuild counterparty 
confidence and to ease liquidity strains in order to address the current turmoil on the
financial markets. One issue will be to improve transparency of exposures to complex 
61 Definition was taken from TeachMeFinance.com, available at: 
http://www.teachmefinance.com/Financial_Terms/credit_crunch.html (visited March 12, 2008).
62 See Bear Stearns: Stripped Bear, The Economist, March 14, 2008, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10870166 (visited March 16, 2008).
63 See Kiff J. and Mills P.: Lessons from Subprime Turbulence, IMF Survey Magazine, International 
Monetary Fund, August 23, 2007, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/RES0823A.htm (visited March 18, 2008).
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assets and valuations of these exposures. These actions are critical to reduce the 
uncertainty about potential losses across financial institutions and for restoring the 
confidence of investors. Systematically important financial institutions should be 
encouraged to rebuild capital cushions in order to improve their capacity to support the 
role as financial intermediaries. This can be happen by inviting new equity investment 
and by cutting dividends. Central banks will have to continue to provide liquidity 
needed to assure the functioning of the markets. But they should be aware of taking on 
credit risk themselves or sending confusing messages about the stance of monetary 
policy. Finally supervisors need to do more to ensure that off-balance sheet exposure of 
banks are properly accounted for and that banks do a better job in managing the risks 
posed by these off-balance sheet liabilities. Critical is also that supervisors and credit-
rating agencies take greater care in assuring that underwriting standards are 
maintained64. 
It will be important to observe how banking systems and credit creation in developed as 
well as in emerging markets will manage the recent crisis that was one of the largest 
financial shocks since World War II.
5.4. World Economic Outlook
Economists at the International Monetary Fund estimate that in response to the 
continuing financial turbulence, global economic expansion will decelerate from 4.9% 
in the year 2007 to 4.1% in the year 200865. Growth will slow down in the U.S.A., 
Western Europe and Japan. Despite the slowing growth in exports, emerging markets 
and developing countries will continue to expand strongly. The ongoing troubles on 
financial markets will reduce domestic demand in advanced economies, which has spill-
64 See Portugal M.: Navigating the Financial Storm: The Financial Market Crisis and the Global 
Economic Outlook – Lessons and Policy Changes, Annual Meeting of Institute for International Finance, 
March 7, 2008, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/030708.htm (visited March 
21, 2008).
65 See World Economic Outlook Update: Financial turbulence clouds growth prospects, International 
Monetary Fund, January 29, 2008, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/update/01/index.htm (visited March 20, 2008).
58
over effects on emerging markets and developing countries. Growth in countries that are 
heavily dependent on capital inflows could be particularly affected but the strong 
momentum of domestic demand in some markets provides upside potential like in 
China and India.
The remaining risks for the global economy in 2008 are rising losses from the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis and that the credit crunch takes hold in advanced countries. A 
greater than projected decline in U.S. domestic demand caused by interactions of 
adverse financial events or corrections in the housing market and on household balance 
sheets would have spill-over effects on other developed counties. Countries with 
substantial exposure to structured financial products linked to U.S. subprime mortgages 
are at greater risk. Emerging markets and developing countries that rely on short-term 
cross-border borrowing from developed countries to finance large current account 
deficits will also remain at a higher risk.
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6. Conclusion
The current credit crisis shows how globalisation has been taken place in the financial 
world and how linked international markets are. In this multi-polar and integrated 
world, economic problems will become more international than they have been before.
Everything started with mortgages originated to borrowers with shaky credit histories to 
finance their dream of an own home. Then when the housing boom ended and things 
went wrong a meltdown in the U.S. market for subprime mortgage loans triggered a 
global financial crisis. European banks and U.S. investment banks had to write down 
billions of dollars and some of them were bailed out. So the turmoil in the relatively 
small market for U.S. subprime residential mortgages spread quickly across the Atlantic 
and inflicted damage on other financial markets and institutions. The fallout cut back 
liquidity in the interbank lending money market that is the heart of the financial system. 
And even worse, fears of a recession in the U.S.A. could trigger a global slowdown. 
Through the concept of securitization mortgage brokers were able to focus on pushing 
the origination number only and investors were happy to invest in top-rated debt 
securities with significantly higher spreads than ordinary corporate bonds. The spread 
and distribution of credit risk all over the world was praised as the innovation of 
structured finance. We saw an incredible expansion of the market for credit derivatives 
and the market players involved like investment banks und credit-rating agencies could 
boost their profits. But a bundle of bad mortgage loans is not much better than a single 
bad mortgage and the challenge for investment bankers was to hide that fact. Therefore 
the originate-and-distribute business model of structured finance created some degree of 
moral hazard. On the other side it is the responsibility of the investors to evaluate 
carefully the investments they make. But it was already too late when investors realized 
that they put money into complex debt securities they did not understand. As a result the 
market for structured finance products dried up and the marvellous recent growth of the 
market came to an abrupt end. 
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So the integration of countries all over the world has been taking place can be seen not 
only in trade or climate change, but also in financial regulation. To deal with global 
challenges we need joint efforts. To keep pace with the financial innovation that has 
created complex financial assets, which can be traded internationally, regulatory and 
supervisory framework cooperation among countries will have to be strengthened. The
lesson that has to be learned by investors is never to rely only on ratings when they 
determine their investment policy.
Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve explained: “The current 
credit crisis will come to an end when the overhang of inventories of newly built homes 
is largely liquidated, and home price deflation comes to an end.”66 That will stabilize 
home values and is particularly important for those held as collateral for subprime-
related securities. “But after a period of protracted adjustment, the U.S. economy, and 
the world economy more generally, will be able to get back to business.” 
66 See Greenspan A.: The Roots of the Mortgage Crisis: Bubbles cannot be safely defused by monetary 
policy before the speculative fever breaks on its own, The Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2007, 
available at: http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110010981%3C/ref%3E (visited March 
5, 2008).
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Appredix
Timeline67
2006:
December 28: Ownit Mortgage Solutions files for bankruptcy.
2007:
February 12: ResMae Mortgage files for bankruptcy.
February 20: Nova Star Financial reports a surprise loss.
March 2: Fremont General stops making subprime loans and puts its subprime business 
up for sale.
March 8: New Century Financial, the second largest subprime lender in 2006, stops 
making loans.
March 20: People’s Choice files for bankruptcy.
March 27: At a Joint Economic Committee hearing, Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, says housing market weakness 
"does not appear to have spilled over to a significant extent.”
April 2: New Century Financial files for bankruptcy.
April 6: American Home Mortgage writes down the value of risky mortgages rated one 
step above subprime.
67 Source if not explicitly mentioned: Schumer C.: The Subprime Mortgage Market Timeline, Joint 
Economic Committee, January 2008, available at: 
http://jec.senate.gov/Documents/Reports/01%2023%2008%20subprime%20timeline.pdf (visited 
February, 2008).
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April 18: Freddie Mac announces plans to refinance up to $20 billion of loans held by 
subprime borrowers who would be unable to afford their adjustable-rate mortgages at 
the reset rate.
April 24: The National Association of Realtors announces that sales of existing homes 
fell 8.4% in March from February, the sharpest month-to-month drop in 18 years.
May 17: At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-Third Annual Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition, Chairman Bernanke reiterates his March statement by 
saying the Fed does not foresee a broader economic impact from the growing number of 
mortgage defaults.
May 25: The National Association of Realtors reports that sales of existing homes fell 
by 2.6 percent in April to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 5.99 million units, the 
slowest sales pace since June 2003. The number of unsold homes left on the market 
reached a record total of 4.2 million.
June 6: ZipRealty Inc., a national real-estate brokerage firm, announces that the number 
of homes listed for sale in 18 major U.S. metropolitan areas at the end of May was up 
5.1% from April. This is a striking deviation from the general trend as tracked by the 
Credit Suisse Group, which says on a national basis, inventories of listed homes have 
typically been little changed in May during the past two decades.
June 23: Bear Stearns, one of the largest investment banks and security trading firms, 
announce to lend $3.2 billion to one of its two troubled hedge funds, which are heavily 
invested in subprime MBSs, in order to stave off the risk of a collapse of the fund.68
68 See Year-End Timeline – Second Quarter, The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2008, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119879374267153845.html (visited January 3, 2008).
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July 10: Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s investor service announce a wave of 
downgrades on MBSs, an indicator that they might have misjudged the risk of these 
securities69. 
July 18: Bear Stearns Cos. explains that two hedge funds, the Bear Stearns High-Grade 
Structured Credit Fund and the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Enhanced 
Leveraged Fund, have lost almost all their value as the MBSs downturn went global. 
July 20: Despite that news the Dow Jones Industrial Average crosses the 14000 barrier 
for the first time. 
In the following weeks stock indices all over the world started to decline and the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average dropped below 13000 points by August 15. Especially stocks 
of financial institutions suffered significant losses as a result of mortgage payment 
defaults and devaluations of MBSs. Also many European banks announced losses due 
to MBSs investments. 
July 31: The shares of mortgage lender American Home Mortgage Investment 
Corporation plunge 89% after they have been halted the day before. The company 
explain that it is unable to finance its mortgages due to increasing margin calls from its 
lenders and demands for cash and collateral70. The mortgage lender files for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection on August 671. In the first half of the year it was the 10th-largest 
mortgage lender of the U.S. with $34.6 billion in loans. But unlike most other bankrupt 
lenders American Home Mortgage almost none of its home loans were to subprime 
borrowers.
69 See Year-End Timeline – Third Quarter, The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2008, available at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119884951243255571.html January 3, 2008
70 See Bajaj V.: Jittery Stock Market Drops as Mortgage Fallout Spreads, The New York Times, August 
1, 2007, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/01/business/01subprime.html (visited January 6, 
2008).
71 See American Home Mortgage Seeks Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, The New York Times, 
August 7, 2007, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/07/business/07home.html (visited January 
6, 2008).
68
August 1: Two hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns that invested heavily in subprime 
mortgages declare bankruptcy. Investors in the funds file suit against Bear Stearns, 
alleging that the investment bank mislead them about the extent of the funds’ exposure.
August 7: German banks organize a bailout for IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG which 
was in trouble because of its investments in subprime residential mortgage CDOs72.
August 9: President Bush addressing the housing market crisis, saying, “The 
fundamentals of our economy are strong…I'm told there is enough liquidity in the 
system to enable markets to correct.” Bush also said, “The conditions for the 
marketplace working through these issues are good. My hope is that the market, if it 
functions normally, will be able to yield a soft landing.”
August 9: French bank BNP Paribas freeze three funds due to subprime-related losses.
August 9 and 10: European Central Bank and Federal Reserve intervene in markets by
pumping billions of dollars of liquidity into the markets.
August 13: Goldman Sachs and a group of investors inject $3 billion to bailout the 
Global Equity Opportunities hedge fund of Goldman-Sachs that lost about 28% of its
market value in the week before.
August 16: Countrywide Financial, the nation’s largest mortgage lender, draws down 
$11.5 billion from its credit lines.
August 17: The Federal Reserve cut the discount rate from 6.25% to 5.75% and 
encouraged banks to borrow from its discount window by lengthening the term of such 
loans to as long as 30 days from the current one day.
August 31: President Bush holds a press conference to highlight the growing problems 
in the subprime mortgage market. He says the “government has a role to play” in the 
72 See Joint Economic Committee Research Report, Number 110-11, available at:
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/JEC_Report.pdf (visited January 9, 2008).
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growing crisis and calls upon the Federal Housing Administration to help subprime 
borrowers refinance into loans insured by the federal agency. The modest FHA program 
is expected to assist 60000 delinquent borrowers. President Bush announces an 
additional program expected to help another 20000 homeowners by reducing insurance 
premiums for those who pose less of a credit risk. Reaching out to Democrats, the
President also expresses support for Michigan Senator Debbie Stabenow’s Mortgage 
Relief Act, which will exempt homeowners from paying taxes on home loans forgiven 
after foreclosure.
August 31: At Federal Reserve meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke reassures investors on Wall Street by stating that the Fed will 
“act as needed” to contain the spreading mortgage crisis and discourage predatory 
lending practices.
September 15: The shares of United Kingdom lender Northern Rock PLC fall 31% after 
it disclosed that it is forced to turn to emergency funding from the Bank of England. 
Customers withdraw more than $2 billion accelerating the fall of shares.
September 18: RealtyTrac Inc. announces that home foreclosure filings surged to 
243,000 in August, up 115 percent from August 2006 and 36 percent from July, 
marking the highest number of foreclosure filings since RealtyTrac began tracking 
monthly filings. The foreclosure filing rate nationally is now one in every 510 homes.
September 19: The Federal Reserve cut the federal-funds rate that is the benchmark 
target rate for overnight lending between banks by half a percentage point to 4.75%.
September 19: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the 
regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, agrees to relax restrictions on the mortgage 
finance companies’ investment holdings, enabling Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy 
$20 billion more in subprime mortgages.
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September 25: According to the S&P/Case-Shiller’s Home Prices Indices, which track 
housing prices in metropolitan areas, home prices continue to fall at an increasing rate. 
The 10-City Composite index shows an annual decline of 4.5 percent – the largest in 16 
years.
September 27: Countrywide Financial Corporation post its first quarterly loss in 25 
years on about $1 billion in write-downs.
October 1: The Swiss bank UBS AG says it has to write down $3.41 billion in fixed-
income assets, including securities tied to subprime mortgages73. 
October 4: Analysts expect that the losses of Merrill Lynch & Co linked to risky 
subprime mortgages amount $4 billion due to the fact that Merrill has been the number 
one underwriter of CDOs since 2004. Three weeks later Merrill explained that write-
down on mortgage-related securities was about $8.4 billion and larger than expected. 
The company’s credit rating was downgraded and their CEO Stan O'Neal retired.
October 9: The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announces its 
intention to review potential conflicts of interest in the credit rating agencies due to 
questionable practices associated with the ratings given to mortgage-backed securities 
that have contributed to the spreading housing crisis. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox 
says: “We have underway right now the beginnings of examinations that are focused on 
conflicts of interest, and books and records examinations, and whether the agencies are 
following their own procedures.”
October 15: Citigroup acknowledges that its risk management models failed its 
customers and shareholders during this summer’s credit crisis, leading to the company’s 
57 percent drop in third-quarter profit. Citigroup was forced to write off $3.55 billion 
and set aside $2.24 billion to cover anticipated losses stemming from failing mortgages 
and consumer loans.
73 See Year-End Timeline – Fourth Quarter, The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2008, available at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119885527558455711.html?mod=JR-Year-End-Review-2007 (visited 
January 4, 2008).
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October 15: Strongly urged to act by the Treasury Department, Citigroup, JPMorgan 
Chase, and Bank of America announce the creation of a new entity, called a Master 
Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, to raise $200 billion in order to purchase securities that 
are otherwise likely to be dumped on the market and further depress the housing debt 
crisis.
October 16: The National Association of Home Builders reports that its housing market 
index, which tracks builders’ perceptions of conditions and expectations for home sales 
over the next six months, dropped to 18, its lowest level since the inception of the index 
in 1985. The housing market index has declined for eight straight months. Builder 
confidence increased in the Midwest by two points, but the region still has the lowest 
overall rate in the nation.
October 17: The Commerce Department reports that U.S. home construction starts fell 
10.2 percent last month to their lowest level in more than 14 years. Building permit 
activity, an indicator of future construction plans, declined 7.3 percent, the largest drop 
since January 1995.
October 18: Standard & Poor’s cuts the credit ratings on $23.35 billion of securities 
backed by pools of home loans that were offered to borrowers during the first half of the 
year. The downgrades even hit securities rated AAA, which is the highest of the 10 
investment-grade ratings and the rating of government debt.
October 24: Merrill Lynch writes down $7.9 billion due to exposure to collateralized
debt obligations, complex debt instruments, and subprime mortgages. As a result, the 
firm takes a $2.3 billion loss, the largest in the firm’s history.
October 29: John Robbins, former chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association, says 
approximately a half of million U.S. mortgage borrowers each year for the next few 
years risk foreclosure. He expects that 1 million borrowers will lose favour with their
lenders each year and that 500000 of them will not be able to save their home loans.
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October 30: Shareholders sue Merrill Lynch & Co for issuing false and misleading 
statements regarding its exposure to risk mortgage investments. The lawsuit seeks class-
action status on behalf of purchasers of Merrill stock between February 26 and October 
23, 2007.
October 31: In a nearly unanimous decision, the Federal Reserve Board lowers the 
federal funds rate by one-quarter percentage point to 4.50 percent.
November 1: The Federal Reserve cut to 4.5% and explain that the risks of weaker 
growth and higher inflation were roughly balanced.
November 4: On top of the $5.9 billion write-down reported in early October, Citigroup 
says it will take an additional $8 billion to $11 billion write-down related to subprime 
mortgages. In a memo to employees announcing his resignation,
C.E.O. Charles O. Prince III writes: “It is my judgment that the size of these charges 
makes stepping down the only honorable course for me.” Mr. Prince leaves with $105.2 
million in cash and stock – in addition to the $53.1 million in compensation he took 
home over the past four years.
November 11: Swiss UBS announces write-downs of $10 billion, becoming one of the 
biggest casualties of the U.S. subprime-mortgage meltdown. Two days later Citigroup 
bailed out seven affiliated structured-investment vehicles and brought $49 billion in 
assets onto its balance sheet.
November 12: The Federal Reserve cut interest rates by a quarter percentage point to 
4.25%.
November 14: HSBC Holdings PLC, Europe’s biggest bank, reports that it took a $3.4 
billion impairment charge at its U.S. consumer finance division, HSBC Finance Corp.
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November 15: Barclays Group PLC takes a $2.7 billion write-down for losses on 
securities linked to the U.S. subprime mortgage market collapse.
November 20: Morgan Stanley posts its fist quarterly loss in 21 years of about $3.59 
billion and disclosed a $9.4 billion write-down on its mortgage assets.
November 29: According to RealtyTrac, there were 222,451 foreclosure filings last 
month. It is a 94 percent increase from October 2006 and represents one foreclosure 
filing for every 555 households in the nation. The 2 percent increase from September 
2007 indicates that the subprime crisis is only getting worse.
December 10: Swiss UBS announced that it has to take new $10 billion write-downs 
related to U.S. subprime mortgages and it may record a full-year loss in 2007. The 
announcement makes the group the biggest victim of the crisis to date among European 
banks74. UBS also announced it has solicited a cash infusion of $11.5 Billion from GIC,
Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, and an unknown Middle Eastern investor.
December 18: The U.S. Commerce Department reported that housing construction was 
down 3.7 percent for the month of November to a seasonally adjusted rate of 1.187 
million units. This marked a 24.2 percent drop in new home construction in the 12 
month period and the lowest level of home construction in more than 16 years.
December 19: Morgan Stanley announced it would be writing down an additional $9.4 
billion in losses on subprime-linked investments. The company also announced it would 
be selling a $5 billion dollar stake to a foreign investment fund.
December 20: Reeling from the subprime mortgage crisis, investment bank Bear 
Stearns announced the first quarterly loss in the institution’s eight-decade history. With 
this announcement from Bear Stearns, Wall Street’s losses had reached a combined $40 
Billion from the subprime mortgage crisis.
74 See Hurst A.: UBS writes down $10 bln, Singapore injects capital, Reuters, December 10, 2008, 
available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSL1049891520071210?sp=true (visited January 8, 
2008).
74
2008:
January 10: Countrywide Financial reported that late mortgage payments and 
foreclosures reached the highest level ever recorded this past December. The 
foreclosure rate on Countrywide’s mortgages grew from just 0.7% a year ago to 1.44%
last month. On the announcement of this news, shares in Countrywide dropped to their 
lowest price in over a decade.
January 11: Bank of America, the nation’s second largest banking institution, 
announced that it would buy Countrywide Financial, the U.S.’s largest mortgage lender. 
This acquisition ended days of speculation that Countrywide, due to its role in the 
proliferation of subprime mortgages, would be forced to declare bankruptcy.
January 11: Merrill Lynch, the nation’s third largest securities firm, announced it would 
need to write down more than double its initial projection related to subprime mortgage 
losses. Initial projections showed Merrill Lynch would lose around $7 Billion; however, 
it now appears that number could reach $15 Billion.
January 15: Citigroup the largest bank in the U.S. announced that its mortgage portfolio 
dropped in value by $18.1 Billion. This news led Citigroup to its first quarterly loss in 
16 years.
January 17: Lehman Brothers said it would no longer continue the practice of wholesale 
mortgage lending. As a pioneer in issuing mortgage backed securities, Lehman Brothers 
also announced it would cut 1,300 jobs. These job cuts come on top of 2,500 other jobs 
eliminated since June 2007.
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Abstract English
In my thesis I first analyzed what caused the U.S. subprime mortgage market meltdown
and why this triggered a global credit crunch. In recent years rising house prices, 
favourable market conditions and a well-defined channel of financial intermediaries 
drove the expansion of the U.S. subprime mortgage market. The result was that 
borrowers with shaky credit history who did not satisfy standard underwriting criteria 
obtained loans, which was praised as innovation. Subprime mortgage loans were packed 
into complex bundles of securities and sold to investors all around the world. Many of 
these mortgage-backed securities received AAA ratings from credit rating agencies that 
also supported and advised the originators. In 2006, thousands of homeowners became 
delinquent and defaulted on their mortgage payments when the housing bubble was 
bursting and interest rate reset to higher levels because they could only afford the initial 
teaser rate of their hybrid adjustable rate mortgages. Unknown exposure dried up the 
demand for mortgage-related securities. In August 2007, U.S. Investment banks and 
large European banks had to write down billions of dollars because of losses of 
subprime-related securities and some of them were bailed out. Fears and uncertainty 
caused a crisis of liquidity and confidence, a global credit crunch in financial markets 
and a sell of on equity markets.
In the second part I looked for the direct impact of global market developments on 
Austria. In a performance analyses I showed that the sell off on the Austrian stock 
market was larger than on other European and American stock markets. I tried to find 
out, if the correlations of the Austrian Traded Index (ATX) with other stock market 
indices changed from the first to the second half of the year 2007 and I found out that 
the correlation coefficients between the ATX and European equity market indices
increased slightly but the correlation between the ATX and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average decreased.
Finally, I took a look on what consequences the credit crisis might has on the U.S. 
subprime lending industry, the U.S. economy and the banking industry and I gave a 
world economic outlook.
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Abstract Deutsch
In meiner Arbeit untersuche ich zunächst die Ursachen der Krise am US-
amerikanischen Hypothekenmarkt und wie diese Entwicklungen eine globale 
Kreditkrise zur Folge hatten. In den letzten Jahren waren steigende Immobilienpreise, 
niedrige Zinsen und ein gut organisiertes Netzwerk aus Finanzintermediären für die 
Expansion des US-amerikanischen Hypothekenmarktes für zweitklassige Hypotheken 
verantwortlich. Schuldner mit schlechter Bonität, die unter standardisierten 
Abschlussbedingungen abgelehnt wurden, konnten so einen Hypothekenkredit 
aufnehmen und sich ihren Traum vom Eigenheim verwirklichen. Die zweitklassigen 
Hypothekenkredite wurden dann in komplexe Wertpapiere gepackt und an Investoren 
aus aller Welt verkauft. Die Emittenten dieser, durch Hypothekenkredite besicherten 
Wertpapiere, wurden bei der Emission von Credit Rating Agencies beraten und 
unterstützt und viele Wertpapiere erhielten ein AAA Rating. Durch das Platzen der 
Immobilienblase und den steigenden Zinsen konnten tausende Schuldner ihre 
Kreditraten nicht mehr bezahlen und ihre Häuser wurden zwangsversteigert. Im August 
2007 wurden Verluste von Amerikanischen und Europäischen Investment Banken in 
Milliardenhöhe bekannt, weil sie sich am U.S. Hypothekenmarkt verspekuliert oder in 
mit Hypotheken besicherte Wertpapiere investiert hatte. Die Unsicherheit führte zu 
Liquiditätsengpässen, Misstrauen zwischen den Banken, einer Kreditkrise und 
panischen Verkäufen auf Aktienmärkten. Um die Auswirkungen globaler 
Entwicklungen auf Österreich zu untersuchen führte ich ein Performancevergleich des 
Austrian Traded Index (ATX) mit anderen europäischen und amerikanischen 
Marktindizes durch. Daraus wurde ersichtlich, dass es heftigere Verkäufe am 
österreichischen Aktienmarkt gab, als an den anderen untersuchten Märkten. Ich zeigte 
auch, dass sich die Korrelationskoeffizienten des ATX mit europäischen Marktindizes 
vom ersten zum zweiten Halbjahr 2007 leicht erhöhten, der Korrelationskoeffizient des 
ATX mit dem Dow Jones Industrial Average sich aber verringerte. Zum Schluss 
analysierte ich noch die Auswirkungen auf das U.S. Hypothekengeschäft, die 
amerikanische Wirtschaft und die Finanzindustrie und gab einen Ausblick auf die 
Weltwirtschaft.
77
CV
Persönliche Daten
Name: Christian Amann
Geboren am: 29. Jänner 1984 in Hohenems
Staatsbürgerschaft: Österreich
Familienstand: ledig
Wohnhaft in: 6845-Hohenems, Rudolf-v.-Emsstr. 7
Email: chris.amann@gmx.at
Schulausbildung
09/94 – 07/98 Bundesrealgymnasium Dornbirn Schoren 
09/98 – 07/03 Höhere Technische Bundes – Lehranstalt Rankweil 
Abteilung Elektronik,  Schwerpunkt: Nachrichtentechnik und  
Telekommunikation
Grundwehrdienst
10/03 – 06/04 Abgeleistet in der Schwarzenberg Kaserne in 5020-Wals, 
Salzburg. Eingesetzt beim Tieffliegererfassungsradar
Studium
10/04 – 02/08 Internationale Betriebswirtschaft an der Universität Wien
Kernfachkombinationen: Banking und Corporate Finance
09/07 – 02/08 Erasmus Semester an der LUISS in Rom, Italien
Studienbegleitende Tätigkeiten
08/05 Zumtobel Staff GmbH in 6850-Dornbirn
07/06 VÖB DIREKT Versicherungsagentur GmbH in 1060-Wien 
10/06 – 06/07 Studienassistent am Lehrstuhl für Finanzwirtschaft und 
Banken der Universität Wien
Weitere Qualifikationen
Fremdsprachen: Englisch, verhandlungsfähig
Italienisch, fließend 
Portugiesisch, Grundkenntnisse
EDV: MS Office
C, C++, Matlab
Hobbys
Fußball in einer Amateurmannschaft, Laufen und Skifahren
